Competition and Coordination by Zheng, Yi
Research Reports








Doctoral thesis, to be presented for public examination with the permission of the
Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki, in Porthania PII,
Yliopistonkatu 3, on the 30th of June, 2020 at 11 o’clock.

Abstract
This thesis discusses competition and coordination in the market. On the supply
side, firms decide optimal competing strategies in pricing while considering corporate
social responsibility. On the demand side, on one hand, consumers can act selfishly
without considering social norms. On the other hand, consumers can coordinate so
that better outcomes can be achieved: for example, a reduction in market inefficiency
or an improvement in welfare. I analyse the relationship between the demand and
supply sides, and study how the preference and behaviour of one side can affect the
other. I then discuss the incentives of both firms and consumers, either competitive,
non-cooperative or coordinative.
This thesis consists of four articles. The first article points out a new cause of
market inefficiency in competitive markets. I propose a coordinative solution to the
problem. I show that the market clears if consumers coordinate in a certain way and,
therefore, confirm the value of coordination in competitive markets. The second article
studies the role of socially responsible actions in a lobbying game. Firms’ investment
in corporate social responsibility, for example, on environmental protection or animal
rights, is proved to be a strategic action that effectively reduces lobbying costs and
improves welfare. The other two articles study boycotts. I examine how consumers’
behaviour that is driven by environmental concerns can jointly cause a change in firms’
behaviour towards more socially responsible actions, and how firms choose their best
reactions to deal with boycotts.
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In this thesis, I discuss how markets work and how market participants, both firms and
consumers, interact with each other and jointly determine market performance. Markets
can be viewed as simple supply-demand games or as complex battlefields of market
participants. On the supply side, there is competition among firms. On the demand
side, there may be coordination among consumers. Between firms and consumers,
conflicts may exist. I study these aspects by analyzing the relationship between the
demand and supply sides, and discuss how the preferences and behaviour of one side
can affect the other. This chapter is organized as follows. I start by discussing the
incentives of the firms and consumers and how they interact in the markets in Sections
1.1 to 1.3. I briefly discuss the games that are used in this thesis in Section 1.4. Section
1.5 provides the summary of the four articles. My contribution to the existing literature
is highlighted in Section 1.6.
1.1 Price and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
When we discuss firms in competitive markets, we usually think that each firm maximises
its profit by competing on the asking prices of the goods (Bertrand competition) or
the amount of output they produce (Cournot competition). In this thesis, I focus on
price competition. Each firm’s optimal strategy in pricing is determined conditional on
(the belief of) its competitors’ strategies. When none of them have any incentive to
change their strategies, they reach Nash equilibrium. The existence of an equilibrium
does not imply market efficiency, which refers to the market-clearing situation where
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the supply is equal to the demand. The optimal strategy refers to an individual firm’s
profit-maximisation while market efficiency relates to social welfare.
Firms compete to attract more consumers and to obtain a larger market share,
thus generating higher profit. Sometimes competitive incentives can have a negative
impact on firms’ decision-making and does not lead to pleasant results as expected. For
example, in wars of attrition, firms compete hard with a periodic cost and eventually
realise the winning prize is far lower than the cumulative costs over the periods of
competition. They could have done better by stopping immediately in the very first
period. I discuss more about wars of attrition and all pay auctions in Chapters 3 and 4.
Nowadays, firms may find it difficult to survive in the market if they are purely
profit-driven. There are more issues that need to be taken into account: environmental
protection, employees’ demands for fair wages and proper working conditions, human
rights, animal rights and gender equality, just to list a few. A firm that neglects these
issues may suffer damage to its corporate image and reputation, as well as the financial
loss arising from public protests (petitions or threats to boycott) or boycotts (stopping
purchases).
According to MSCI KLD rankings,1 firms receive scores for being socially responsible
if they have committed to or invested in the following issues: (1) environment; (2)
community and society; (3) employees and supply chain; (4) customers; and (5)
governance and ethics. In this thesis, I mostly use environment as the example to
define firms’ moral preferences. That is, a firm using polluting production technology is
viewed as socially irresponsible; while a firm using environmentally friendly production
technology is viewed as socially responsible.
The following aspects go to the heart of the research question in three articles in
this thesis. For a firm that voluntarily behaves in a socially responsible way, driven by
its moral values, whether costly investment in CSR can generate profitable returns for
itself and/or improve welfare? For a firm that does not voluntarily behave in a socially
responsible way, what is sufficient to force it to make changes? The force can be driven
by, for example, social pressure and boycotts. I discuss these further in Chapters 3 – 5.
1MSCI KLD stands for Morgan Stanley Capital International, Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini &
Co. For more details about KLD rankings, see https://www.nbs.net/articles/msci-kld-scores
(accessed on 13 January, 2020).
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1.2 Selfishness and Collective Action
Consumers’ preferences are a combination of many factors (Alger and Weibull, 2013).
It is impossible to say that one consumer is purely selfish, that is, does whatever is best
for her/his own interest (homo oeconomicus), or that another consumer is purely moral,
that is, does whatever is the ‘right’ thing based on moral standards (homo kantiensis).
Consumers usually have combined preferences of these two, but weigh one more heavily
than the other. However, in modelling, for simplifying purposes, we may view some
consumers to be the selfish type and others to be the high-moral type.
Consumers can be non-cooperative. They are self-interested without considering, for
example, social norms. In mass markets where a punishment is difficult to impose on
‘faceless’ consumers, communication and commitment become difficult to rely on due
to free riding. If they had cooperated in some way, a better outcome could have been
achieved. Consider cleaning in a shared flat. If I think one or some of my flatmates
will clean the flat at some point, I do not bother to do anything (free riding on the
benefits of others’ contribution). Unfortunately, free-riding incentives can easily lead
to unpleasant results. If everyone thinks alike, there is de facto ‘no ride’ — no one
will clean and therefore there will be no benefit for each resident to free ride on. This
tells us that at least one person needs to sacrifice her/his time and energy in order
to have a clean house. This can be achieved by cleaning in turn based on an agreed
schedule, and punishing the lazy person who does not do her/his shift properly. It can
also be achieved by cleaning together so that each is only responsible for a small part.
In these cases, the residents are cooperative and the benefits from collective actions are
generated. I discuss more about the willingness to sacrifice, the incentives to free ride
and the (non-)cooperative behaviour in Chapter 4.
Consumers can be coordinative. They are well-organized and act together effectively
towards a common target. The purpose of coordination is to improve social welfare, or
at least the total utility of some groups. I discuss the value of coordinative actions in
greater detail in Chapter 2.
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1.3 Markets
Market participants’ incentives and motivations, either competitive, (non-)cooperative
or coordinative, jointly determine market performance. The equilibria are thus derived
conditional on both firms’ and consumers’ strategies and preferences.
Consumers can be inactive. This means they are price takers and passively accept
the asking prices set by the firms. Firms decide the optimal pricing strategies based
on consumers’ aggregate demand. On the other hand, consumers can be active. This
means they attempt to influence the market and, in some circumstances, are willing to
sacrifice their own utility and take costly strategic actions, like in boycotts. Firms may
find it necessary to act towards boycotters’ wishes, shouldering the attendant costs, in
order to attract more consumers.
An equilibrium refers to a stable state in which each participant has no incentive to
change her/his/its behaviour. It does not necessarily mean the equilibrium is efficient,
for example, such that the market clears. Market clearing refers to the situation in
which the goods produced by the firms are all sold to the buyers who demand them
and there is nothing left in the market. Market clearing usually links to improvement
in social welfare. To some extent, it is a win-win situation for both sides of the market:
firms obtain the sales revenue by trades and consumers buy if purchasing generates
positive utility, that is, if the valuation of the products is higher than the asking price.
I discuss market inefficiency more deeply in Chapter 2.
1.4 Games
Game theory is a tool to analyze market performance and rationalize the behaviour
of participants. Several games are used in the thesis: Bertrand competition, all pay
auction and war of attrition. The equilibrium solution concepts are Nash and subgame
perfect equilibria.
Bertrand competition was named after Bertrand (1883) and later studied and
extended by many economists, most notably Edgeworth (1925). It has become one of
the very first things we learn in game theory or industrial organization theory courses.
A Bertrand competition is a price competition. In a duopoly market, a firm chooses the
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optimal pricing strategy conditional on (the belief of) its competitor’s pricing strategy.
A Nash equilibrium is a situation in which both firms set their prices equal to their
marginal costs, which brings zero profit to both. As a refinement, a Nash equilibrium is
subgame perfect if it is a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the original game.
Auctions contain interesting features that make them good candidates to model
market competition. First, auctions are essentially games of conflicts. Second, bidders
are non-cooperative. Third, auctions are usually one-winner games, or in boycotts,
one-side games (where either the demand or supply side wins). In this thesis, I do not
allow a game to end in a tie. Finally, auctions are usually one-shot games. The loser
does not have a chance to replay. In an all pay auction, bidders pay whatever they bid
regardless of who the winner is. Like other types of auctions, the one who bids the
highest wins. I use an all pay auction to model the competition for a monopoly position
between two firms where the socially responsible investments affect the authority’s
determination of the winner.
A war of attrition is a special case of an all pay auction. The key difference is that
a war of attrition is considered as the optimal stopping game, where the one who fights
longer wins, and the one who surrenders earlier loses. The game is played once and ends
immediately when one player (or one side in a boycott example) stops fighting. Each
player pays a cost in every active fighting period until the game ends. The costs spent
in the past are sunk costs and therefore do not affect each player’s decision-making in
the current period. However, the continuation value that will be generated if the game
continues to the next period matters.
1.5 Review of the Chapters
In this section, I provide a review of four articles.
1.5.1 Market Inefficiency, Entry Order and Coordination
Chapter 2 is coauthored with Professor Kultti. The causes of market inefficiency are
many. We suggest an additional cause — buyers’ random entry order. In a market
where identical sellers compete for buyers of heterogeneous valuations, first come first
served is the norm. Since all buyers choose the cheapest available good, a low-valuation
5
buyer who enters the market late may find the remaining goods unaffordable, which
causes markets not to clear. We therefore propose a coordination solution to the market
inefficiency problem. We find that in a market where all the high-valuation buyers enter
first and all the low-valuation buyers enter afterwards, the market clears effectively.
Moreover, we find the inefficiency arising from buyers’ entry order becomes less of a
problem in larger economies and vanishes in the limit.
1.5.2 Socially Responsible Procurement in Lobbying Game
Chapter 3 is coauthored with Dr Hämäläinen. We study how socially responsible
procurement affects the money that firms allocate to influence the outcome of a public
procurement contest, modeled as an all-pay auction. Firms can try to increase their
competitiveness in the market for government contracts both directly by lobbying and
by investing in corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR investments could take many
forms (e.g., corporate governance vs. environmental investments), making them harder
to compare for the government authority than lobbying spending. As a result, CSR
acts as an effective differentiation strategy for firms. We show that socially responsible
procurement (i) alleviates the competition among firms for government contracts, (ii)
shifts firms’ public relations spending from lobbying to CSR investment, and (iii)
decreases the total amount of money that a firm spends to influence the authority. This
is welfare-improving in so far that lobbying spending is socially wasteful.
1.5.3 Non-organized Boycott: Alliance Advantage and
free-riding Incentives in Uneven Wars of Attrition
Chapter 4 in published in the Eurasian Economic Review. We study non-organized
boycott activities. We develop a boycott model in which multiple consumers on the
demand side come into conflict with a misbehaving monopolist on the supply side. The
goal of the boycott is to force the firm that lacks corporate social responsibility to
change its behaviour, for example, abandon polluting production technology in favour
of environmentally-friendly actions. We analyze consumers’ and firm’s incentives and
equilibrium strategies. We describe the difficulty of winning a non-organized boycott
in reality. We find that consumers’ free-riding incentives limit the real boycott power
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even when the benefits to free ride are small. The larger the market served by the firm,
the more likely an individual consumer would stop boycotting (who acts as a strict
environmentalist), which leaves fewer boycotters remaining in the costly conflict (who
act as loyal supporters of the product). On the other hand, we show that market size
does not significantly affect the firm’s strategies. For a large firm, the consumer boycott
will surely be effective, that is, lead to non-zero boycotter participation, but hardly
successful, that is, not lead to the firm’s cessation of misbehaviour.
1.5.4 A Note on Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and
Signalling
Chapter 5 is a note to a published article. In an interesting article, Glazer et al. (2010)
develop a duopoly model of consumer boycott to analyze firms’ optimal strategies.
Firms make decisions on their output and their production technology, either clean or
polluting. Boycott refers to non-purchasing action from a polluting firm. Non-boycotting
behaviour incurs a cost in social pressure. To avoid such cost, some low-moral consumers
join the boycott. The equilibrium is derived under the condition that the low-valuation
buyers with sufficiently high demand, that is, those with higher valuation than that of
the marginal consumer, would boycott.
In the first part of this article, we suggest that since all the low-valuation consumers
are indifferent between two firms (see Lemma 1 in Glazer et al. (2010)), the marginal
consumer cannot be uniquely determined. Consequently, there exist many equilibria.
We construct equilibria in two polar cases following the settings in the original article. In
the second part, we propose a solution to the model by considering Bertrand competition.
We find that investing in clean technology (behaving ethically) is not necessarily optimal
for firms, in terms of payoffs, although the ethical firms benefit from the consumers’
heterogeneous preferences and the cost of social pressure.
1.6 Contribution
In this section, I provide a review of related literature and present my contribution to
the topics.
Chapter 2 discusses market inefficiency and buyers’ coordination as a potential
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resolution for this issue. The market inefficiency problem and its many causes are widely
studied. The causes are related to externalities or informational problems.(see Radner
(1979), Vives (1988, 2017), Angeletos and Pavan (2007, 2009), Gilson and Kraakman
(2014)). Adverse selection (Spinnewijn (2017), Einav et al. (2010), Bundorf et al. (2012))
and signalling (Vermaelen (1981), Borenstein et al. (2007)) are prominent examples. We
point out a new cause — random entry order of buyers. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no literature that focuses directly on market performance where the order in
which the participants enter the market is studied. To solve the inefficiency problem,
we propose a coordination solution. We find that by coordinating buyers’ entry order
in a certain way, the market clears. Thus we confirm the value of coordination in the
competitive market which is consistent with many studies on congestion games.
The value of coordination has been studied extensively after Wardrop (1952) who
first proposed traffic assignment problems and Rosenthal (1973) who first proposed
congestion games. The standard solutions to the problems of coordination are taxes
or tolls; they are designed to minimise individuals’ latency (delay in the traffic) (see,
e.g., Caragiannis et al. (2010) and Cole et al. (2006)) or to achieve social optimum (see,
e.g., Arnott et al. (1990) and Caragiannis (2013)). Tumer et al. (2009) present two
methods to reduce congestion by coordinating the drivers’ departure times in order
to avoid peak-hour traffic, or by implementing a reward system that penalizes the
driver who greedily seeks the lanes with high road capacity. Christodoulou et al. (2009)
examine how coordination improves the allocation of scarce and shared resources, for
example, commonly used facilities, among selfish players. The quality of coordination
is evaluated by the price of anarchy, that is, the ratio between the welfare under the
optimal centralised solution and the welfare generated by the worst equilibrium.
In electricity markets, the coordination mechanism has also been studied to reduce
transmission congestion, avoid enforced curtailments and ensure the security of energy
transmission, see for example Fang and David (1999), Yamina and Shahidehpour
(2003a,b), Bjørndal and Jörnsten (2007), Kunz and Zerrahn (2015). (Fang and David,
1999) analyze the transmission congestion problem in an unbundled electric system.
To avoid enforced curtailments, the authors propose a coordination solution between
electricity users and the Independent System Operator (ISO). That is, in the dispatch
periods, the operator uses priority transmission and broadcasts information including
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prices, line congestion and curtailment so that the users adjust their demands. They
also suggest that coordination with a generic operator is best for improving transmission
conditions as well as for global social welfare.
These models are usually not market models, in which pricing decisions play an
important role. On the contrary, the introduction of markets is often suggested as a
solution.
The difficulties of achieving coordination without the help of an outside party
can be caused by the agents learning too slowly (Gabuthy et al., 2006), by imperfect
information (Bell et al., 2003) or by the large number of participants (Knez and Camerer,
1994). Albrecht (2019) uses a market setting to study a coordination problem. He
studies it in (imperfectly) competitive markets which feature Pareto-ranked equilibria.
An outcome is deemed a coordination failure if the corresponding equilibrium is not
Pareto-optimal. He focuses on the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, and suggests
that efficient equilibria exist in the competitive environments.
We discuss market inefficiency and the value of coordination in a set-up different
from all of the above. We consider a market where in principle everyone could trade
but where the interaction between pricing and the order of entering the market creates
problems. This is a novel cause of inefficiency that is particularly relevant in a small
market; when the economy grows the inefficiencies vanish.
Chapter 3 discusses the value of investing in socially responsible projects in
lobbying contests. In a competitive market, two firms lobby for the monopoly position
by simultaneously choosing the bidding strategies and the investment levels in socially
responsible actions. CSR investments are assumed to be preferred by the authority
and therefore have an influence on determining the winner2. We extend Ellingsen
(1991)’s lobbying game by considering the authority’s preference for CSR investments
and the difficulty of comparing the values and effects of such investments. Our model
is similar to Carlin (2009), which analyzes consumer obfuscation in financial products
markets, but we replace the price competition model with all-pay auctions, which is
the standard way of analyzing contests in the literature. Our results confirm the value
of CSR investments consistent with the findings of many game theorists and social
2Authorities all over the world have established guidelines for socially responsible procurement.
See https://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/index_en.htm and https://www.fedcenter.gov/
programs/buygreen/index.cfm? (accessed on 13 January, 2020).
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scientists.
The value of CSR has been studied both theoretically and empirically by economists
and social scientists. Bénabou and Tirole (2010) suggest that spending on CSR can
sometimes be regarded as a firms’ adoption of a more long term perspective. Indeed,
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) show that socially responsible investing, where companies are
selected based on CSR, leads to high abnormal returns. On the other hand, Kotchen and
Moon (2012) find empirical support for the hypothesis that companies invest in CSR
to offset corporate social irresponsibility. We suggest that CSR is a welfare improving
alternative to a more socially costly behavior, i.e., lobbying. Besley and Ghatak (2007)
argue that firms do not have a comparative advantage in CSR investment even when
consumers desire it because a free-riding problem arises in private provision. Our article
differs from earlier work in that we do not focus on the desirability of CSR but rather
on its strategic use by firms in socially responsive procurement where the authority
regards various investments in CSR favorably; Baron (2001) considers strategic use
of CSR by firms in a more general setup where rival firms are targeted by activists.
Empirical researches show that firms that invest more in corporate social responsibility
(CSR) receive more contracts in procurement (Flammer, 2018) and get a higher return
on their lobbying spending (Garcia, 2016).
Our analysis connects (i) the industrial organization literature on differentiation and
obfuscation and (ii) the public choice literature that analyzes rent-seeking in lobbying
contests. Investing in CSR is an efficient lobbying strategy in our model because it
enables a firm to differentiate from its rival and make the choice among firms harder
for the authority.3 This is shown to relax the competition for government contracts
similarly to what happens in markets; see Perloff and Salop (1985), Wolinsky (1986),
Shaked and Sutton (1982). There is also a link to the literature on strategic complexity
and obfuscation in consumer markets, e.g., Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Ellison and
Wolitzky (2012), Wilson (2010), Piccione and Spiegler (2012), Chioveanu and Zhou
(2013), which observe that firms have incentives to make their products harder for
consumers to analyse. This has adverse effects on consumers and market welfare.4
However, our article shows that in contests the effects of CSR investment strategy could
instead be positive since by alleviating competition it additionally reduces wasteful
3For a classic article on environmental product differentiation, see Reinhardt (1998).
4But see Taylor (2017) where obfuscation allows screening and improves welfare.
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spending. This is because competition is not usually productive in lobbying, unlike in
markets.5
The last two chapters discuss boycotts, that is, conflicts between firms lacking
awareness of corporate social responsibility and consumers with moral concerns. Chapter
4 studies non-organized boycott activities in a monopoly market where two consumers
boycott the polluting firm (a two-against-one game). The model extends Maynard Smith
(1974)’s classic two-contestant game of war of attrition by adding the third player to
the demand side. By introducing free-riding incentives and alliance advantages to the
demanders, we have a game where two consumers play a prisoners’ dilemma against
each other and jointly they play a war of attrition against the polluting firm. Limited
studies have focused on a third contestant’s contribution and influence in a war of
attrition framework taking account of incentives to free ride and alliance advantage.
The closest studies to ours are Haigh and Cannings (1989); Bulow and Klemperer
(1999) and Helgesson and Wennberg (2015), which discuss n-player competing for one
or several prizes and Powell (2017) discusses third-party intervention in wars.
Several articles study consumer boycotts in different settings. Friedman (1991);
Delacote (2008) provide conceptual discussion on boycott actions. Tyran and Engelmann
(2005) provide an experiment on boycott in reaction to a sudden cost increase in retail
markets. They find that the cost increases the incidence of boycotts. Boycotts reduce
market efficiency. Innes (2006) develops a model where two non-identical duopolists face
a threat to boycott from an environmental organisation. He finds that at equilibrium a
small persistent boycott against the small firm or a large transitory boycott would work
against the large firm. It implies that larger firms are easier to defeat. Baron (2001)
employs a game between an influential activist and a monopolist that has concerns for
profit maximisation, altruism and activist’s powerful threats. From a psychological
perspective, John and Klein (2003) explain consumers’ boycotting incentives and
willingness to sacrifice. Heijnen and van der Made (2012) find that in a market under
asymmetric information where consumers can signal high moral values, consumers
always boycott with positive probability despite free-riding incentives. It will eventually
result in a change in the firm’s behaviour. In a war of attrition framework, Peck
5As known since Tullock (1967), the possibility of acquiring a monopoly position by influencing
public choice not only reduces welfare by alleviating competition in product markets (captured by the
“Harberger triangle” of deadweight loss) but also generates losses because of unproductive lobbying
competition (represented by the “Tullock square” of dissipated rents).
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(2017) analyzes a game between a monopolist that produces two-period durable goods
and consumers that demand a lower price. He derives both non-boycott equilibrium
and boycott equilibria where boycott occurs with positive probability. Egorov and
Harstad (2017) develop a boycott game between a public regulator, a misbehaving
firm and activists. They find that in a two-player game without the regulator, ‘private
politics’ is beneficial for activists but harmful for firms. Meanwhile, in a three-player
game, ‘private politics’ is harmful for activists but beneficial for firms. I contribute
to the literature by demonstrating that the small benefit of free-riding is sufficient to
undermine the probability of boycott success. I also discuss how market size affects a
firm’s decision-making. Therefore I describe the difficulty of winning a non-organized
boycott in reality and give motivation for further research on well-organized boycotts.
Chapter 5 serves as a discussion note and an extension to a published article by
Glazer et al. (2010) which studies boycotts in a duopoly market. I first discuss the
determination of the equilibrium in the original article. I suggest the existence of a
continuous set of equilibria. Then I propose a solution to the model by considering
Bertrand competition.
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Chapter 2
Market Inefficiency, Entry Order
and Coordination1
2.1 Introduction
The standard causes of market inefficiency are related to externalities or informational
problems that manifest in the pay-off relevant private information of some market
participants (see Radner (1979), Vives (1988, 2017), Angeletos and Pavan (2007, 2009),
Gilson and Kraakman (2014)). Adverse selection (Spinnewijn (2017), Einav et al. (2010),
Bundorf et al. (2012)) and signalling (Vermaelen (1981), Borenstein et al. (2007)) are
prominent examples. In this article we point out an additional phenomenon that give
rise to inefficient outcomes. It is the order in which market participants enter the market.
When there are, say, buyers with heterogeneous valuations, and capacity-constrained
sellers who price the goods before the buyers enter, the sellers typically use mixed
strategies in pricing. The low pricing sellers target low-valuation buyers, and make sure
that they get to trade. Other sellers take some risk and target high-valuation buyers.
The risk arises as buyers always buy the cheapest available goods. If high-valuation
buyers enter first there are only high-priced goods left to the low-valuation buyers; not
all possible trades are consummated.
Consider an example: in an online dating network, women and men search for
partners. Women post the selection criteria of desired men such as hobbies, job,
education, height, age and so on. Men read the posts and contact the women if they
1This chapter is based on an article jointly written with Klaus Kultti.
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meet the criteria. The criteria are viewed as an implicit prices. Women and men are
viewed as individual sellers and buyers, respectively. Of course women are different
from each other, but for simplicity we assume they are identical. We also assume that
once a woman receives a contact, she leaves the dating network immediately so that
there is no further searching and matching. Therefore, in this dating network, the
matching results depend mainly on the price level (the posted selection criteria) and
buyers’ timing of entering the market (the time that men start searching online and
finding the posts). Entering the dating network too late results in a lower chance of
finding a match since some women have already left the market by then.
This simple observation can be used to study the value of coordination in markets
where competition amongst the sellers does not solve the problem. We employ a setting
where there are equal numbers of sellers and buyers. The sellers are identical with
one unit of an indivisible good for sale. They set the prices prior to the arrival of the
buyers and commit to the sticky prices. The buyers are of two types. Half of them are
low-valuation buyers whose reservation price is v, and the other half are high-valuation
buyers with reservation price unity. Each buyer has unit demand for the good.
We employ a static game. Once the prices are posted, the buyers have take-it-or-leave-it
offers and price negotiation is not allowed. The reason for such a setting is as follows.
In a dynamic setting where prices can be adjusted, that is, the sellers can lower the
prices to serve the low-valuation consumers, the market will clear and the inefficiency
problem will be solved. However, we need to take into account that the high-valuation
buyers have an incentive to pretend to be of low-valuation so that they obtain the goods
with lower prices. The discount factor also affects the timing of purchasing. These
features complicate the analysis and are not helpful in solving the inefficiency problem
of our interests.
We analyze three different scenarios. In the benchmark case, the buyers enter
the market in a random order, and in a symmetric equilibrium the sellers use mixed
strategies in pricing. The remaining cases constitute the two polar ways of coordinating
the buyers’ order of entry to the markets. In one case all the high-valuation buyers
enter the market first. It turns out that the sellers’ symmetric pricing strategy is a
pure one where every seller asks price v. All the possible trades are consummated, and
there are no inefficiencies. In the other case, all the low-valuation buyers enter the
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market first. The equilibrium pricing is in mixed strategies, and competition for the
high-valuation buyers is more intense than in the benchmark case. As a result, the
allocation is also more inefficient.
What is notable is that in all three cases the sellers’ expected pay-off is v, and in
this sense the value of coordination can be evaluated by considering the buyers only; the
sellers do not care what the buyers do. It is worth noting that the value of coordination
does not arise from there being more resources available nor there being equilibria that
can be Pareto-ranked; in all the cases there is exactly one symmetric equilibrium. The
inefficiencies arise because of the order in which the buyers enter the market, and for
efficiency comparison, the ordering is the only thing we vary.
We follow Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) and measure the market (in)efficiency
using the ratio between the total ex-ante value created and the total ex-ante value
created if the market clears. In the benchmark case we attain explicit expressions for
the inefficiency. The results demonstrate that the inefficiency vanishes quite quickly as
the economy grows. The case where the low-valuation buyers enter the market first
is more complicated in terms of explicit expressions but we provide an approximate
solution and conduct numerical analysis. We find that the inefficiencies are much more
substantive, and vanish much more slowly than in the benchmark case as the economy
grows. In all cases, however, the degree of inefficiency becomes smaller as the economy
becomes larger, and vanishes in the limit.
We are not aware of literature that focuses directly on market performance where
the order in which the participants enter the market is studied. Of course, the value of
coordination is recognised in a multitude of settings. For instance, almost by definition,
any model of congestion demonstrates the value of coordination. In traffic settings,
taxes and tolls are proposed in Caragiannis et al. (2010) and Cole et al. (2006).
There are many reasons why achieving coordination is difficult without an outside
party but the number of participants is clearly one of the most important. Knez and
Camerer (1994) suggest that coordination succeeds in a two-player game but difficulties
arise in a group of three or more players. Albrecht (2019) uses a market setting to
study a coordination problem. He studies it in a (imperfectly) competitive matching
market with sunk investments which features Pareto-ranked equilibria. An outcome is
deemed a coordination failure if the corresponding equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal.
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He shows that with sufficient heterogeneity of the participants all the equilibria are
efficient once the solution concept is refined to trembling-hand perfectness.
Our article discusses market inefficiency and the value of coordination in a set-up
different from all of the above. We consider a market where in principle everyone could
trade but where the interaction between pricing and the order of entering the market
creates problems. This is a novel cause of inefficiency that is particularly relevant in a
small market. When the economy grows the inefficiency vanishes, which is contrary to
what Knez and Camerer (1994) observe in their experiments.
We find that a market setting without any inherent frictions, like physically separated
sellers, exhibits inefficiencies that are not related to private information. A natural
assumption that the buyers enter the market in a random order, associated with
the sellers’ capacity constraints gives rise to strategic behaviour in pricing leading to
unattainable gains from trade. In general, one would expect that if the markets are small,
the price taking assumption does not hold, and there is a case for strategic behaviour.
One would also expect that as the market grows, strategic behaviour becomes less
important.
If one party, the buyers, coordinates its actions, the other party, the sellers, responds
by changing its pricing behaviour. The sellers are always able to change their behaviour
in a way that retains their expected pay-off regardless of the buyers’ actions. In a
large economy, the resources per capita remain the same, and consequently the gains
in efficiency are due to the changes in the sellers’ actions. A redeeming feature of the
model is that the gain from strategic behaviour vanishes, as well as the inefficiencies.
We point out a specific way to coordinate the buyers’ order of entry that solves the
problem, and we also study the other extreme, namely the entry order of the buyers
that generates the most inefficient outcome. This is interesting because it results in the
fiercest competition amongst the sellers in the sense that fewer trades are consummated
and more resources are wasted. It demonstrates that competition as such does not lead
to an efficient outcome.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we develop a benchmark
model where buyers enter the market in a random order. We derive the equilibrium
strategy for sellers and analyze the market efficiency. In Section 2.3, we study the
coordination model where buyers of same type enter the market at the same time. In
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Section 2.4, we provide the numerical solutions for the equilibrium strategies and the
measures for market efficiency. We compare the results of the benchmark and the
coordination games and discuss how market size, buyers’ valuation and coordinative
actions affect market efficiency. In Section 2.5, we discuss the logic of how the
coordination would happen in the market so that it could effectively solve the market
inefficiency problem. Section 2.6 concludes the article.
2.2 Benchmark Model: Random Entry Order
Consider an economy where there are 2n sellers, each with a unit of an indivisible good,
serving 2n buyers.2 The good is not long-lasting so the unsold items cannot be put into
the resale market with discounted prices. The sellers are identical while the buyers are
of two types. Half of the buyers value the good at unity and the other half at v < 1. All
these are common knowledge. The game is static and in two stages. In Stage One, the
sellers make the pricing decisions prior to the arrival of the buyers. Once the prices are
posted, the sellers do not adjust them.3 In Stage Two, the buyers enter the market in a
random order. The choice set for each buyer is binary: she/he buys if her/his valuation
is higher than the lowest available price; Otherwise she/he does not buy. All the sellers
are in the same location so that the buyers can see all the prices and then choose the
lowest-priced good.
We impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The valuation of the low-type buyers v is less than 1/2.
If v is higher, the equilibrium is a pure strategy one where each sellers asks price v.
Assumption 1 guarantees that the pricing is in mixed strategies. Note that we could
also guarantee a mixed strategy equilibrium by varying the proportion of high-valuation
buyers but it is simpler to focus on v.
To derive the sellers’ pricing strategies, we first show that there is no pure strategy.
2If there are more sellers than buyers, a Bertrand-outcome where sellers reduce the price to zero
ensues. If there are more buyers than sellers, sellers will set high prices to target the high-valuation
buyers and leave some (or all) low-valuation buyers unserved. The profit will attract more sellers to
enter the market. Equal numbers of buyers and sellers would be the outcome if we had an entry stage
with entry cost c < v.
3The logic of the sellers’ incentive to commit to the sticky prices is as follows: if the price is not
sticky but can be negotiated to serve buyers of heterogeneous types, the buyers have incentive to
pretend to belong to the low-valuation type.
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Lemma 1. The sellers use symmetric mixed strategies in pricing.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose there is a pure strategy such that
identical sellers set the price at p′. First, we show that p′ = 1 or p′ ∈ [0, v] cannot be
an equilibrium. When p′ = 1, the probability of a trade is the probability of matching
with a high-valuation buyer which is 1/2. Therefore the sellers’ expected profit is 1/2.
If one deviates to a slightly lower price 1 − ε where ε is a small positive number, it leads
to a trade with one of the high-valuation buyers surely and thus generates the utility
1 − ε. That is, for any ε < 1/2, it is a profitable deviation. Similarly p′ = v cannot
be an equilibrium. Asking price v would sell the good with certainty. A deviation to
price 1 generates the expected utility 1/2, which is higher than the utility of asking v
by Assumption 1. For the same reason, any price that is lower than v clearly cannot be
an equilibrium.
Finally, consider price p′ ∈ (v, 1). Any price in this range is too expensive for the
low-valuation buyers. Therefore 2n goods are on offer to n high-valuation buyers. It
leaves each seller the expected utility p′/2. A deviation to a slightly lower price p′ − ε
ensures the sell and generates a profit p′ − ε. That is, for any ε < p′/2, there is a
profitable deviation. This completes the proof.
Next, we derive a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. It is clear that the
sellers use mixed strategies such that with probability ρA(n) they post price v, and with
probability 1 − ρA(n) they use a continuous mixed pricing strategy G on some interval
[a, 1] where v < a < 1 and the value of ρA(n) depends on the market size, that is, the
exogenous value of n. The mixed strategy implies that the sellers target consumers of
both types. The probability ρA(n) cannot be zero. Otherwise 2n sellers compete for n
high-valuation buyers and leave all the low-valuation buyers unserved. The outcome is
similar as in a Bertrand competition where sellers reduce the price to v.
To evaluate the performance of the market, we first solve the number of unsold
items and the probabilities that such circumstances occur by taking account of the
buyers’ random entry order. Denote the number of sellers who ask price v by j. We
find the following result.
Lemma 2. The expected number of unsold goods is n(1 − ρA(n)).
Proof. We first show that if fewer than half of the sellers ask price v, that is, if
j < n, the number of unsold goods varies between n − j and n; if at least half of the
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sellers ask price v, that is, if j ≥ n, the number of unsold goods varies between zero
and 2n − j.
When j < n and the low-valuation buyers enter the market first, they buy all the
goods priced at v and find the remaining goods unaffordable. The high-valuation buyers
then enter the market and buy the cheapest available goods. That is, j goods go to
the low-valuation buyers and n go to the high valuation, which leaves n − j unsold. If
the high-valuation buyers enter the market first, they buy j cheap and n − j expensive
goods. Since all the n remaining goods are too expensive for the low-valuation buyers,
none is sold. Therefore the number of unsold items varies between n − j and n for
j < n.
The probability that the number of unsold items is n − j + k, k ∈ {0, 1, ..., j}, is




. In the denominator there is the number of ways to
choose j from a total of 2n sellers in the market. In the numerator there is the product
of choosing j − k low-valuation buyers and k high-valuation buyers among the first j
buyers.
Analogously, when j ≥ n, the number of unsold goods varies between zero, if the
low-valuation buyers enter the market first, and 2n − j, if the high-valuation buyers
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where ρA(n) is the probability that sellers set the price at v. By Vandermonde’s identity,
24














































































































Again, by Vandermonde’s identity, we have ∑2n−j−1k=0 ( n2n−j−1−k)(n−1k ) = ( 2n−12n−1−j).
































































Denote the Binomial distribution function of Bin(p, n) by F (p, n, x). The above
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. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Next, we determine ρA(n), that is, the probability that the sellers ask price v. We
already know that the pricing is in mixed strategies. The prices are either at v or
continuous in the range of [a, 1] where v < a < 1. At equilibrium, a seller’s utility of
asking price v, which is the lowest price in the support of the mixed strategy, must
equal the utility of asking price 1, which is the highest in the support.
Denote a seller’s linear utility function by U(p) where p is the price asked by the
seller.4 If a seller asks price v, since every buyer has the same or higher valuation for
the good, the seller trades for certain. Therefore the seller’s expected utility is
U(v) = v · 1 = v. (2.6)
If a seller asks the highest price unity, we need to consider two cases. If fewer than half
of sellers set their price at v, that is, when j < n, the seller does not trade regardless of
buyers’ entry order. Unity would be too expensive for the low-valuation buyers and
high-valuation buyers choose lower-priced goods. If at least half of the sellers set price
at v, that is, when j ≥ n, buyers’ entry order determines the trading probability. Let
the indicators 1{j<n} and 1{j≥n} represent the two cases discussed above. The expected

























The utilities in Equations (2.6) and (2.7) should be equal at equilibrium. Solving
4Of course the utility depends on the prices of all the other sellers but we suppress this dependence.
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⇒ ρA(n) = (2v)1/n. (2.8)
This gives us the following result.
Proposition 1. In a market where the buyers enter in a random order, the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium5 is such that the sellers ask price v with probability ρA(n) given
by
ρA(n) = (2v)1/n.




= Value created by tradesValue created under market clearing =
n · 1 + n · ρA(n) · v




where T1 is the total ex-ante value created in equilibrium. T0 is the total ex-ante value
created from trades that would be generated if the market cleared. MA(n) = 1 represents
the most efficient case and 0 represents the least efficient. We find that MA(n) increases




1/n + v1+1/n log(2v)
n2(1 + v) > 0 and limn→∞ M
A
(n) =
1 + 1 · v
1 + v = 1.
This shows that in a large economy the inefficiency vanishes. Furthermore, fixing n and
5Since we are interested in how random entry and coordination affect market inefficiency, we do
not solve the equilibrium explicitly. It is enough to know how many sellers ask price v.
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increasing the low-valuation v, MA(n) decreases for small vs and increases for large vs
after reaches its lowest point, say ṽ, i.e, MA(n) is U -shaped. The derivative
∂MA(n)
∂v
= −n + 2
1/nv1/n(1 + n + v)
n(1 + v)2
is negative for small enough v and positive otherwise. We demonstrate the behaviour of
MA(n) numerically in Section 2.4. The interpretation is as follows. As v goes down, the
probability ρA(n) decreases which indicates that the competition for the high-valuation









The value of T1 increases slowly for small vs and then the rate goes up. Meanwhile
the value created under market clearing (T0) also increases in v. However, since T1
is convex and T0 is linear, the rates of increase are different, and this leads to the
non-monotonicity of MA(n) as calculated in Equation (2.9).The graphs for T0 and T1 are
in the appendix.
We have established that the buyers’ random entry to the markets associated with
the sellers’ capacity constraints lead to pricing in mixed strategies. This gives rise
to inefficient outcomes where not every profitable trade is consummated. In a small
economy, market efficiency, as measured in Equation (2.9), shows that it largely depends
on the low-type buyers’ valuation for the good, while in a large economy, inefficiency
vanishes. Next, we compare these results to a setting where the buyers are able to
coordinate their order of entry.
2.3 Coordination
2.3.1 Low-valuations first
In this section we analyze the model where the buyers coordinate on the entry order.
To start with, we consider the case where all the low-valuation buyers enter the market
first and all the high-valuation buyers enter after them. This could be the first reaction
to the inefficiency of the previous section where the low-valuation buyers could not
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trade as the high-valuation buyers who enter before them grab the low-priced goods.
But this turns out to be a bad solution, or the worst possible, as it ignores the sellers’
reaction to the entry order. When the low-valuation buyers enter first, the competition
for the high-valuation buyers is the highest, and consequently the inefficiencies are also
at their highest level.
It is again clear that there is no pure strategy equilibrium, and that in a mixed
strategy equilibrium there has to be a mass point at price p = v. Denote the probability
that the sellers ask price v by ρB(n). The utility of asking price unity must be equal to
that of asking price v. At the lowest price level v, a seller makes a trade for certain
and therefore generates utility v. At the highest price 1, as before, we denote by j the
number of the sellers who set price at v. If fewer than half of the sellers choose v, that
is, for j < n, only j low-valuation buyers trade and the rest, n − j, remain unserved.
The high-valuation buyers who enter the market after would choose from the cheapest
goods available in the market. Therefore the seller who asks the highest price 1 does
not trade. If at least half of the sellers choose v, that is, for j ≥ n, all buyers are served














where the probability ρB(n) is the solution to the above equation. For any given n > 0
and v ∈ (0, 1/2), the equation has a positive root in the range of (0, 1), a root above
1, a negative root and 2n − 4 imaginary roots if n is an even number. If n is odd, the
equation has one positive root in (0, 1) and 2n − 2 imaginary roots.
Lemma 3. For any given n > 0 and v ∈ (0, 1/2), the solution to the probability of
asking price v, ρB(n), is unique.











)2n−1−j − v. (2.11)
We want to prove that for any n > 0 and v ∈ (0, 1/2), there exists a unique real solution
ρB(n) ∈ (0, 1) satisfying X(ρB(n)) = 0. X(ρB(n)) is clearly continuous. X(0) → −v < 0
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when ρB(n) → 0 and X(1) → 1 − v > 0 when ρB(n) → 1. By the Intermediate Value
Theorem, there exists at least one ρ such that X(ρ) = 0. Also by X ′(ρB(n)) > 0 on the
interval (0, 1),6 the function X(ρB(n)) is monotonically increasing. It therefore shows
that for each pair of (n, v), the real number solution to ρB(n) in Equation (2.10) is always
unique in the range of (0, 1).
We provide the numerical solution to ρB(n) in Section 2.4 which shows that given v,
ρB(n) monotonically increases in n and approaches 1/2 for large enough ns. Here we first
prove the existence of the limit of ρB(n) when n grows without bound. We then provide
an approximate solution to ρB(n) for large ns.
Lemma 4. As n → ∞, ρB(n) approaches 1/2.
Proof. We view {ρB(n)}∞n=1 as a sequence of real numbers satisfying X(ρB(n)) = 0 and
denote the limit of the sequence by ρ̂ if there exists any. Let S2n−1 = Bin
(
2n − 1, ρB(n)
)







ρjn (1 − ρn)2n−1−j = 1 − Pr (S2n−1 ≤ n − 1) .
Standardising by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, the
above equation is equal to
1 − Pr
⎛⎝ S2n−1 − (2n − 1)ρB(n)√
(2n − 1)ρB(n) (1 − ρn)
≤ n − 1 − (2n − 1)ρ
B
(n)√
(2n − 1)ρB(n) (1 − ρn)
⎞⎠




by F2n−1. Then the
above expression is equivalent to




. The central limit theorem implies that F2n−1 (an) ≈ Φ (an)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standardised normal distribution.
This holds only for 1 − 2ρB(n) ≈ 0, i.e, ρB(n) ≈ 1/2. In Appendix I, we make this
rigorous.
6The solution of X ′(ρB(n)) is available upon request.
30
Lemma 5. For large ns, the probability of asking price v is approximately given by
ρB(n) =
√











and Φ (y) = 1 − v is the distribution function of the standardised normal distribution.
For any exogenously given v, the value of y can be found in the Z table.
Proof. We know that for large n, normal distribution is a good approximation
for binomial distribution. Let Y2n−1 be a binomial random variable with the success











is thus rewritten as
Pr (Y2n−1 ≥ n) .
When n is large, the last expression is about
Pr



































where Φ is the distribution function of the standardised normal distribution. Assuming,
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for instance, that v = 0.1, we have
1 − Φ (y) = 0.1 or Φ (y) = 0.9
from which we get
y ≈ 1.28 or b(n) ≈ 1.28√
n
.
Note that the Z table is required for the value of y. As n goes to infinity,
b(n) → 0 := b̂
Rewriting Equation (2.13), we get
ρB(n) =
√





Since b(n) deceases in n and converges to zero, the approximation of ρB(n) also converges.
The limit is7
ρB(n) → 1/2 := ρ̂.
Proposition 2. In a market where the buyers coordinate such that all the low-valuation
buyers enter the market first, the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium is such that the
7As ρB(n) approaches one half, it may seem that Condition X(ρ
B
(n)) = 0 cannot hold for large n
because v can be anything less than one half. The resolution is that ρB(n) grows slowly with n so that
the Condition remains valid. We check the rate of convergence.
ρB(n) =
√


















|ρn − 1/2| = 1 and limn→∞
|ρn+2 − ρn+1|
|ρn+1 − ρn| = 1.
The sequence ρB(n) converges to 1/2 sublinearly and logarithmically. The rate of convergence is 1.
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For large economy, the probability ρB(n) approaches 1/2.






















(n · v + n · 1).
The first term represents the value created if less than half of the sellers asks price v,
that is, at j < n. In this case, j low-valuation and n high-valuation buyers would be
served and leaves n − j goods unconsumed in the market. The second term represents
the value created if at least half of the sellers ask price v, that is, at j ≥ n. In the later





Value created by trades











(j · v + n · 1) +∑2nj=n (2nj ) (ρB(n))j (1 − ρB(n))2n−j (n · v + n · 1)
n · 1 + n · v .
(2.15)
2.3.2 High-valuations first
Next we consider the other polar case where the high-valuation buyers enter the market
first and the low-valuation buyers enter afterwards. The high-valuation buyers buy the
lowest-priced goods, which leaves some (or all) of the low-valuation buyers unserved
depending on how many cheap goods remain by the time they enter the market.
Consider a pure strategy p = v that generates the expected profit v. Clearly there is
no profitable deviation. Since high-valuation buyers only choose the cheapest available
goods and low-valuation buyers cannot afford the price that is higher than v, a deviation
to the price p′ > v means there will be no trade and therefore brings zero profit. A
deviation to the price p′ > v ensures the trade with one of the high-valuation buyers
but generates a lower profit. We thus get the pure symmetric equilibrium as follows.
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Proposition 3. In a market where the buyers coordinate such that all the high-valuation
buyers enter the market first, the symmetric equilibrium is a pure pricing strategy p = v.
Asking price v brings the utility v to all sellers in the market. It ensures that buyers
of both types will be served. The market clears. The efficiency is therefore MC = 1
regardless of the market size, i.e., the value of n.
2.4 Comparison
In this section, we provide numerical solutions and compare the results in the above
models. We discuss how market size, valuation of low-type buyers and buyers’ entry
orders affect market efficiency.
Table 2.1 reports the numerical solutions for the probabilities ρA(n), as solved explicitly
in Equation (2.8), and ρB(n), as shown in Equation (2.10). The market size is represented
by 2n where the values of n are chosen from 2 to 2000. The valuations of the low-type
buyers v are 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4, respectively. The solutions to ρB(n) is reported in the
odd columns and the solutions to ρA(n) are provided in the even columns for comparison.
As shown in each column, as n grows large, the probability ρA(n) in the benchmark
Table 2.1: The probabilities of asking price v in the benchmark and the coordination
cases
Valuation (v)
















2 0.1958 0.4472 0.2871 0.6325 0.3633 0.7746 0.4329 0.8944
3 0.2466 0.5848 0.3266 0.7368 0.3898 0.8434 0.4463 0.9283
4 0.2786 0.6687 0.3501 0.7953 0.4052 0.8801 0.4539 0.9457
5 0.3010 0.7248 0.3661 0.8326 0.4156 0.9029 0.4590 0.9564
6 0.3177 0.7647 0.3779 0.8584 0.4232 0.9184 0.4627 0.9635
7 0.3309 0.7946 0.3870 0.8773 0.4290 0.9296 0.4656 0.9686
8 0.3415 0.8178 0.3944 0.8918 0.4337 0.9381 0.4679 0.9725
9 0.3504 0.8363 0.4004 0.9032 0.4376 0.9448 0.4698 0.9755
10 0.3579 0.8513 0.4056 0.9124 0.4408 0.9502 0.4713 0.9779
50 0.4360 0.9683 0.4579 0.9818 0.4737 0.9898 0.4873 0.9955
100 0.4547 0.9840 0.4702 0.9909 0.4814 0.9949 0.4910 0.9978
1000 0.4857 0.9984 0.4906 0.9991 0.4941 0.9995 0.4972 0.9998
2000 0.4899 0.9992 0.4933 0.9995 0.4959 0.9997 0.4980 0.9999
a The number of sellers and buyers are both 2n. Thus n in the first column of the table represents
half size of the market.
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model approaches 1 while the probability ρB(n) in the coordination model approaches
1/2, holding v unchanged. As shown in each row, the values of ρA(n) and ρB(n) increase in
v, holding n constant.
Figure 2.1 illustrates how the valuation v affects the probabilities at equilibria,
especially in a small economy. The values of ρB(n) at v = 0.1 (green dots) are much lower
Figure 2.1: The comparison of the probabilities







v = 0.1, ρA(n)
v = 0.1, ρB(n)
v = 0.4, ρA(n)





than at v = 0.4 (red dots) for small ns. When the economy grows, dots in both colours
move upwards, as the arrow points. The green curve increases quickly and get very
close to the red one at n = 30. For sufficiently large n, say n ≥ 45, the values of ρB(n)
approach 1/2 and become much less dependent on the selection of v. The trend for ρA(n)
is very similar, as illustrated in blue (for v = 0.1) and grey dots (for v = 0.4).
We report the measures of market efficiency in Table 2.2. In the odd columns, MA(n)
measures the market performance where the buyers enter the market randomly. In even
columns, we report MB(n) which measures the market performance under the buyers’
coordination, as Equation (2.15) shows. The market size is given by 2n where n is set
to be 5, 10, 50 and 100, respectively. The valuations of low-type buyers are chosen from
0.1 to 0.475. We find that the values of market efficiency in both models have the same
trend. In each column, we hold the number n unchanged and let the valuation v vary.
We find both MA(n) and MB(n) decrease first and then increase. We highlight the cutoff
points in blue cells. For each pair of n and v, MA(n) is always larger than MB(n). It shows
that when the buyers enter the market randomly, market inefficiency is, by comparison,
a smaller problem. Buyers’ coordinative actions in this way do not help the market
clear. In each row, we hold v unchanged and let n increase. We find that the higher
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Table 2.2: The measures of the market efficiencies
Market size (half) (n)
















0.1 0.97498 0.96271 0.98649 0.97330 0.99712 0.98795 0.99855 0.99147
0.125 0.96271 0.95815 0.98562 0.97014 0.99696 0.98655 0.99847 0.99048
0.15 0.97209 0.95465 0.98521 0.96771 0.99690 0.98549 0.99844 0.98973
0.175 0.97179 0.95203 0.98516 0.96590 0.99691 0.98469 0.99845 0.98917
0.2 0.97209 0.95016 0.98541 0.96461 0.99697 0.98412 0.99848 0.98877
0.225 0.97289 0.94891 0.98590 0.96375 0.99709 0.98375 0.99854 0.98850
0.25 0.97411 0.94821 0.98661 0.96327 0.99725 0.98354 0.99862 0.98836
0.275 0.97569 0.94798 0.98748 0.96311 0.99744 0.98347 0.99871 0.98830
0.3 0.97759 0.94816 0.98851 0.96323 0.99765 0.98352 0.99882 0.98834
0.325 0.97975 0.94869 0.98965 0.96359 0.99790 0.98367 0.99895 0.98845
0.35 0.98215 0.94952 0.99092 0.96416 0.99816 0.98392 0.99908 0.98862
0.375 0.98475 0.95062 0.99227 0.96491 0.99844 0.98424 0.99922 0.98885
0.4 0.98753 0.95195 0.99369 0.96582 0.99873 0.98464 0.99936 0.98913
0.425 0.99046 0.95348 0.99519 0.96686 0.99903 0.98509 0.99952 0.98945
0.45 0.99353 0.95518 0.99675 0.96802 0.99935 0.98560 0.99967 0.98981
0.475 0.99671 0.95702 0.99835 0.96929 0.99967 0.98615 0.99983 0.99019
the valuation v is, the higher MA(n) and MB(n) would be. It suggests that in a growing
economy, the inefficiency vanishes slowly.







MA(n), n = 5
MB(n), n = 5
MA(n), n = 10





Figure 2.2 illustrates how the market efficiencies MA(n) and MB(n) change in v when
the values of n are 5 and 10, respectively. They are all U–shaped curves with different
lowest points. Given n = 5, the value of MA(n) (magenta dots) drops slightly until it
reaches the lowest point 0.971, after which it rises. Meanwhile, the value of MB(n) (brown
dots) is much smaller. It starts from 0.962 (at v = 0.1), moves downwards to the lowest
point 0.947 (at v = 0.275) and increases thereafter. For n = 10, MA(n) and MB(n) follow a
similar trend, as illustrated in orange (for MA(n)) and cyan dots (for MB(n)). The cause of
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the trend for MA(n) has been discussed in the benchmark case and the same argument
applies to MB(n). Recall that market efficiency is measured by the ratio between the
total ex-ante value created from trades that each equilibrium generates (T1) and the
total ex-ante value created from trades that would be generated if market clears (T0).
The trend arises because the rate of increase for T0 in the denominator is different from
that of T1 in the numerator. We provide the graphs for T1 and T0 in the appendix.
Note that the measure of market efficiency (MC(n)) is 1 if all the high-valuation buyers
enter the market first, as described in Proposition 3. Therefore, such coordination
effectively solves the market inefficiency problem.
2.5 Discussion
Our benchmark of buyers entering in a random order is a natural starting point to
study the lack of coordination. Then we study the two polar cases in which all the
low-valuation buyers entering first might be regarded as a natural solution to the
problem where the low-valuation buyers do not get to trade. This, however, ignores
the sellers’ reactions. Whatever the order of buyers entering, the sellers pricing reflects
their competition for the high-valuation buyers. When the low-valuation buyers enter
first, fewer trades are consummated and more goods are wasted, which shows that
the competition is the fiercest.8 This manifests in high inefficiency, and shows that
competition is not always beneficial. This is no big news but the point is rarely made
in a market setting of buyers and sellers. The underlying reason for the inefficiency is
that the high-valuation buyers are a fixed and valuable resource, and competition for a
fixed resource tends to be wasteful.
In the other polar case the high-valuation buyers enter first. This turns out to be
the most efficient order of entry; as the high-valuation buyers are the first in the market
there is no need to compete for them. Rather, the pricing, where all the sellers ask
price v, reflects the fear of not being able to trade. The situation is very much like the
sellers facing a downward sloping demand curve. This order is the choice of a social
planner, and it can also be rationalized by the following informal argument.
8It is unlike the standard market competition, where fiercer competition means that lower prices
attracts more buyers. Here, since the numbers of buyers and goods are fixed, price competition affects
the number of trades and therefore the level of market efficiency. The market is fierce in the sense that
more goods are wasted and fewer buyers are served.
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Instead of entering the markets, assume that the markets are opened at a
predetermined time and the buyers arrive in random order to a queue. If they enter
the market in this order, the situation corresponds to our benchmark case. Consider
the high-valuation buyers in the queue, and allow each of them to ask the person just
before them whether the person would like to swap positions for a small sum of money.
Each low-valuation buyer would be willing because the best they can expect in the
market is buying a good worth v at price v.
If this procedure is allowed to go on for sufficiently many rounds the end result is
that all the high-valuation buyers occupy the first half of the position in the queue, and
all the low-valuation buyers are at the back. Notice that no high-valuation buyer is
willing to pay enough to another high-valuation buyer to swap places. As far as the
sellers understand what is going to happen they revise their pricing strategy accordingly.
2.6 Conclusion
Efficiency considerations are of central interest in any market mediated activity, and
there are many causes of inefficiency. In this article, we discuss an issue that has
not received much attention, that is, the buyers’ entry order. We employ a simple
game where identical sellers compete for the buyers of heterogeneous valuations. We
derive the sellers’ equilibrium pricing strategies, and find that in the benchmark model
where buyers enter the market randomly, sellers use the mixed strategies in pricing. In
equilibrium, not all the low-valuation buyers trade, which leads to market inefficiency.
We then compare the equilibrium results in the benchmark with that of two coordination
cases where buyers of the same type enter the market at the same time. We find that
the sellers react to the buyers’ new entry order and use either a pure strategy or a
different mixed strategy in pricing. In each of these three cases, the equilibrium is
unique.
We then measure the market inefficiencies in these three cases by the ratio between
the total ex-ante value created from trades that equilibria generate and the total ex-ante
value created from trades that would be generated if market cleared. This comparison
provides us with a measure of inefficiency, and also an understanding of how it vanishes
as the economy grows. It is notable that in the limit the inefficiency vanishes regardless
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of the buyers’ order of entry. The order only affects the speed of convergence to the
efficient outcome.
We study the markets where the goods are not long-lasting so the efficiencies cannot
be improved by selling the unsold items at discounted prices. The sellers compete
for a fixed amount of buyers with limited resources, unlike the standard competition
where lower price and more quantity will attract more buyers. The coordination is
designed to relax the competition among the sellers so that more trades are conducted
and fewer products are wasted. The possible real-life application of this model can be a
fish market or a ticket-selling market for a concert.
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Appendix I: Proof of Lemma 4
By Barry-Esseen theorem









))3/2 1√2n − 1 (2.16)
Since F2n−1 (an) = 1 − v for all n, we get
|1 − v − Φ (an)| ≤ 3(
1 − ρB(n)
)3/2 1√(2n − 1)ρB(n) (2.17)
From the indifferent condition (2.10), v < 1/2 and the above arguments, it is clear that
0 < ρB(n) < 12 , and that there is a constant α > 0 such that ρ
B
(n) ≥ α = 14 .
Since the sequence is closed and bounded, by the Bolzano–Weierstrass Theorem, it
is sequentially compact and therefore has a convergent subsequence in Rn. It remains





converges to 12 . It is clear that
for sufficiently large n, it must be the case that 18 ≤ ρB(n) ≤ 78 . Consequently, as n grows
indefinitely, the right hand side of Equation (2.17) goes to zero, that is,




when n → ∞.














) where the first term remains
bounded and the second term converges to zero as n grows without limit.
Let us next assume that the subsequence {ρnk}∞k=1 → c. If c > 12 then ank → −∞,
and Φ (ank) → 0 which is a contradiction. Analogously, if c < 12 then ank → ∞, and
Φ (ank) → 1 which is a contradiction.
Since every convergent subsequence converges to 12 , by compactness, the whole
sequence converges to 12 .
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Appendix II: The Values Created in Equilibrium and
under Market Clearing
Figure 2.3: The values created in equilibrium and under market clearing










The figure shows how the valuation of low-type buyers (v) affects the total ex-ante
value created from trades that equilibrium generates in the benchmark case (T1) and
the total ex-ante value created under market clearing (T0), when n is set to be 2. For
large ns, the two curves are very close to each other, therefore we cannot see their
difference properly. T1 is convex and T0 is linear. The difference in the rates of increase
for T1 and T0 is the cause for the trend of market efficiency measures, as stated after
Proposition 1. The efficiency MA(n) evaluated by the ratio between T1 and T0 has the
trend such that for a given n, the efficiency decreases for small vs, and after some cutoff
point, increases. MB(n) follows a similar trend, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
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“There is one and only one social responsibility of business – to ... engage in activities
designed to increase its profits.”
Milton Friedman (1970)2
3.1 Introduction
Authorities all over the world have established guidelines for socially responsible
procurement. The EU has recently published voluntary criteria for green
public procurement (for public space maintenance, for food, catering services
and vending machines, etc. in 2019). The US has several programmes that
promote environmentally-friendly procurement (environmentally preferable purchasing,
comprehensive procurement guidelines, green procurement programmes, etc.).3 Also,
the OECD has launched a program to advance the consideration of responsible business
practices in public procurement, encompassing various environmental, social and
economic aspects (including, e.g., human rights and labour rights). These policies
are designed to change the incentives of firms. Indeed, empirical research shows that
firms who invest more in corporate social responsibility (CSR) receive more contracts
in procurement (Flammer, 2018) and receive a higher return on their lobbying spending
(Garcia, 2016). Why exactly this happens is not yet very well understood.
1This chapter is based on an article jointly written with Saara Hämäläinen.
2Friedman M (1970). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The New York
Times Magazine, 13 September, 1970, available at: http://umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf
(accessed on 12 January, 2020).
3See https://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/index_en.htm and https://www.fedcenter.
gov/programs/buygreen/index.cfm? (accessed on 13 January, 2020).
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To provide a framework for analysis, this paper studies socially responsible
procurement in a model of a lobbying contest. Firms can try to increase their
competitiveness in the market for government contracts both directly by lobbying
and by investing in CSR, which is regarded favourably by the tendering authority. We
study how socially responsible procurement affects the money that firms allocate to
influence the outcome of the contest. An important assumption is that comparing firms’
relative merits becomes harder for the authority if the public relations (PR) strategy of
a firm relies partly on investment in CSR. There are several reasons to rationalise this
assumption. First, there are many guidelines that encourage the authority to select
a more socially responsible firm. There is no universally accepted guideline to define
socially responsible actions and rank their importance. Second, the comparison of firms’
CSR investment requires clear rules to assess their impacts or to quantify the quality
of the investment, for example, to what extent a project can contribute to society.
However, there is no clear rule for this purpose. The comparison depends greatly on
the authority’s personal judgement. Third, CSR investment can take various different
forms. It is highly unlikely that the two competing firms invest in identical projects
and the spending on each project is also the same. A firm’s socially responsible profile
usually consists of a set of actions. These jointly make it difficult for the authority
to compare two firms’ merits and drawbacks and consequently make it difficulty to
determine the more suitable winner in the lobbying contest. Fourth, misinformation
from dishonest firms is a growing issue. Firms that claim to be environmentally friendly
may not be fully trustworthy.4
There exists, for example, the MSCI KLD scoring system5 that is widely used by
investors to evaluate firms’ ethical and socially responsible performances. KLD Research
& Analytics Inc. gives scores to firms that invests in or make commitments on the
following five aspects: (i) environment, (ii) community and society, (iii) employees
and supply chain, (iv) customers, and (v) governance and ethics. The scores help
conscious investors choose more ethical and socially responsible firms, but are typically
not applicable for the authority reviewing the proposals of firms competing for a public
contract, leaving the authority with the task of comparing the firms in terms of multiple,
4See for example, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/mar/22/
top-oil-firms-spending-millions-lobbying-to-block-climate-change-policies-says-report
5MSCI KLD stands for Morgan Stanley Capital International, Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co.
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diverse environmental, social and economic measures.
In this paper, we show that socially responsible procurement, thus, (i) alleviates
the competition among firms for government contracts, (ii) shifts firms’ PR spending
from lobbying to CSR investment, and (iii) decreases the total amount of money that
firms use to influence the authority. This is welfare improving because expenditures
on lobbying are typically at least partially socially wasteful. As a result, we find that
socially responsible procurement is actually socially responsible in the sense of reducing
inefficient spending. Firms are also better off because they no longer need to compete
their profits away in lobbying. Investing in CSR is hence shown to be rational even
for firms that care only about their profits. In general, our finding of incomplete rent
dissipation in contests where firms can differentiate their political strategies may also
help to reconcile the Tullock (2001) paradox of why firms spend so little in lobbying for
often substantial rents.6
The basic model is deliberately simple. There are two firms competing for a contract
which gives the winner some profit. The decision of which contractor to choose is
delegated to a government authority. To influence the authority, firms can spend money
on PR, with the options of either spending it solely on lobbying or partly investing in
CSR. The total spending otherwise affects the outcome as in a standard lobbying game:
the firm with higher spending wins the prize. However, with the introduction of CSR
investments, the authority finds it difficult to compare the value of the investment and
thus to determine a more suitable winner. The difficulty comes from the fact that the
value and effect of the investment is under the authority’s personal judgement. The
authority may not view an investment as socially responsible or may face difficulties
in assessing and quantifying the effectiveness of a CSR investment. Also, it is highly
unlikely that two firms would invest in the same socially responsible projects and the
spending is also exactly identical so that the investment can be directly compared.7
We first characterize the equilibrium for the case of symmetric firms. The equilibrium
turns to be in mixed strategies. This entails that firms mix in spending on lobbying
and investing in CSR. One interpretation is that in some years a firm’s PR budget
6In their influential paper, Ansolabehere et al. (2003) also ask why is there so little money in the
US political lobbying, and recently Borisov et al. (2015) show that lobbying increases the stock market
value of a firm, which also suggests that rents are not fully dissipated in the process of lobbying.
7The model is quite similar to that of Carlin (2009), employed to analyze consumer obfuscation in
financial products markets, but here his price competition model is replaced by an all-pay auction,
which is the standard way of analyzing procurement contests in the literature.
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features only lobbying while in other years the firm allocates most of this budget to
CSR investment. As a typical finding in all-pay auctions (Baye et al., 1996), each firm
also economizes on cost by randomizing the total amount spent on influencing the
contest outcome. Interestingly, we find that lobbying is a more competitive strategy
and CSR spending a less competitive strategy for a firm. The decision between the
two strategies depends on the firm’s (random) level of expenditure: The firms whose
expenditures fall below a cutoff level prefer to spend all their money on CSR (to alleviate
competition) and firms who spend more prefer to spend their money on lobbying (to
intensify competition). This is because lobbying can lead to head-on competition where
the firm that spends more always wins. If the firm invests in CSR instead, the authority
is compelled to take it into consideration, although it is difficult to estimate – giving
the firm a chance to win on a low budget.8 In an extension, we analyze the case where
firms differ. Then we find that the more efficient firm, which gains more from winning
the contest, is more competitive and is thereby more likely to lobby and not spend on
CSR. We discuss possible interpretations and exceptions to this rule in the paper.
There are different approaches to CSR in economics. On the one hand, Bénabou
and Tirole (2010) suggest that spending on CSR can sometimes be regarded as a firm’s
adoption of a more long term perspective. Indeed, Kempf and Osthoff (2007) show
that socially responsible investing where companies are selected based on CSR leads to
high abnormal returns. On the other hand, Kotchen and Moon (2012) find empirical
support for the hypothesis that companies invest in CSR to offset corporate social
irresponsibility. In our paper, CSR is instead an welfare improving alternative to a more
socially costly behavior, i.e., lobbying. Besley and Ghatak (2007) argue that firms do
not have a comparative advantage in CSR investment even when consumers desire it
because a free-riding problem arises in private provision. Our paper differs from earlier
work in that we do not focus on the desirability of CSR but on its strategic use by firms
in socially responsive procurement where the authority regards various investments
in CSR favourably; Baron (2001) considers strategic use of CSR by firms in a more
general set-up where rival firms are targeted by activists.
Our analysis connects (i) the industrial organization literature on differentiation and
8 Even when the authority is so corrupt that it only cares about expenditures that benefit it
directly, established guidelines for sustainable procurement likely compel it to consider investment in
CSR as well.
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obfuscation and (ii) the public choice literature that analyzes rent-seeking in lobbying
contests. For excellent surveys of contest literature, see Nitzan (1994) and Corchón
et al. (2018). Investing in CSR is an efficient lobbying strategy in our model because it
enables a firm to differentiate from its rival and make the choice among firms harder
for the authority.9 This is shown to relax the competition for government contracts,
similarly to what happens in markets (see Perloff and Salop, 1985; Wolinsky, 1986;
Shaked and Sutton, 1982). There is also a link to the literature on strategic complexity
and obfuscation in consumer markets, e.g., Gabaix and Laibson (2006); Ellison and
Wolitzky (2012); Wilson (2010); Piccione and Spiegler (2012); Chioveanu and Zhou
(2013), which observe that firms have incentives to make their products harder for
consumers to analyze. This has adverse effects on consumers and market welfare.10
However, our paper shows that in contests the effects of strategic complexity could
instead be positive since, by alleviating competition, it additionally reduces wasteful
spending. This is because competition is not usually productive in lobbying, unlike in
markets.11
Explanations of the Tullock’s paradox (Tullock, 2001) have previously concentrated
on, e.g., asymmetric payoffs (Hillman and Riley, 1989) and war of attrition type
competition (Riley, 1999). We observe that spending is more limited with socially
responsible procurement where firms can affect the government authority by investing
in CSR instead of lobbying. Technically, we find that by investing in CSR a firm
can introduce a “consolation prize”, to be allocated to the firm that loses the game,
lowering the incentive to win the “first prize”. In the literature, the availability of a
consolation prize and noise in a contest is known to limit lobbying spending on contests
with multiple prizes (Barut and Kovenock, 1998) and on contests with additive noise
(Long, 2013). However, the trade-off between the first prize and the consolation price
that firms encounter here is a novelty. The question is related to optimal contest design
(Kirkegaard, 2012; Siegel, 2014; Seel and Wasser, 2014; Haan, 2016). The twist in our
paper is that contest payoffs derive from the strategies of the contestants and not from
that of a contest designer.
9For a classic article on environmental product differentiation, see Reinhardt (1998).
10But see Taylor (2017), where obfuscation allows screening and improves welfare.
11As known since Tullock (1967), the possibility of acquiring a monopoly position by influencing
public choice not only reduces welfare by alleviating competition in product markets (captured by the
“Harberger triangle” of dead weight loss) but also generates losses because of unproductive lobbying
competition (represented by the “Tullock square” of dissipated rents).
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The paper is organized as follows. The model is first set up in Section 3.2 and the
nature of equilibrium strategies described in Section 3.3. Then, we characterize the
equilibrium in symmetric procurement contests with CSR investment in Section 3.4 and
the case of asymmetric contests in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 discusses various extensions
of our analysis. Section 3.7 concludes the analysis.
3.2 Model
Two firms i = 1, 2 compete for a contract, which gives the winning firm i a profit of Ti.
The decision of choosing the contractor is delegated to a government authority. The
authority works under guidelines that require it to favour socially responsible business
practices.
To influence the authority, firms allocate money to PR. Two firms move
simultaneously. The action set is (ei, ci) which represents the total spending on PR
ei ∈ [0, Ti] and the share allocated to CSR investment ci ∈ {L, H}, respectively. The
action H represents a high proportion of the total expenditure on socially responsible
projects and the complementary action L represents a low proportion.12 For consistent
language and simplification purposes, from now on, efforts (e) refer to the total
spending and investments (c) refer to the strategic spending on CSR related matters
for the purpose of differentiating itself from the competitor. Firms decide their effort
and investment levels at the same time.
When no firm invests in CSR, the authority compares the efforts directly like in
a standard all pay auction: the firm that exerts higher effort wins. When one or
both invest, the value and effect of the investment is under the authority’s personal
judgement. The authority’s difficulty to assess and evaluate the value of the investment
is measured by δ(ci, cj). With probability 1 − δ(ci, cj) where i = j and i, j ∈ {1, 2}, the
authority favours the investment and is able to assess the quality of the investment
properly. That is, the value of both firms’ investment can be quantified and thus
compared directly. However, with probability δ(ci, cj), the authority is uncertain about
the quality of the investment, i,e, whether the invested projects are socially responsible
12For simplicity, we let the CSR investment level be binary. Alternatively, we could let ci vary
in the range of [0, 1] and the corresponding probability that the difficulty of determination occurs,
δ(ci, cj), increases in both arguments ci and cj where i = j, that is ∂δ∂ci > 0. Such settings complexify
the calculation but do not change the main results.
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and to what extent they contribute to society. Consequently, it causes the difficulty to
determine the more suitable winner among two competing firms. Furthermore, the high
investment level (ci = H) is assumed to consist of a more complex portfolio of projects
related to CSR. The low investment level (ci = L) is assumed to be more simple and





now on, uncertainty (δ) refers to the probability that the difficulty of determination
occurs.
Table 5.2 shows the firms’ choices in the investment and the authority’s uncertainty
levels that are caused by these choices. When both firms choose the high investment





L δ0 = 0 δ1 λ
H δ1 δ2 1 − λ
λ 1 − λ
Firms i and j choose the investment level
ci, cj ∈ {L, H} where L represents the low and
H represents the high level, i = j and i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
The probability of choosing L is λ ∈ [0, 1]. For
each pair of investment levels (ci, cj), it results
in a certain level of uncertainty in determination
and this happens with probability δ(ci, cj) ∈ [0, 1],
where 0 =: δ0(L, L) < δ1(H, L) < δ2(H, H) ≤ 1.
level H, the uncertainty reaches its highest at δ2(H, H) ≤ 1. When both choose L,
without loss of generality, we normalise the uncertainty δ0(L, L) to be zero. That is,
the winning prize rewards the firm with the higher effort. Naturally, if one and only
one firm chooses H, the uncertainty δ1(H, L) = δ1(L, H) is medium. The profit of a
firm is thus given by







no diffculty︷ ︸︸ ︷[





where for the mixed strategy over ei with continuous support, Fj(ei) denotes firm j’s
cumulative distribution of effort. With probability δ(ci, cj), the authority determines the
winner by a draw, that is, each firm has an equal chance of winning. With probability
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1 − δ(ci, cj), the authority determines the winner according to the effort directly.
Firm i’s expected profits by choosing the investment ci ∈ {L, H} and the effort ei
are
Πi(L, ei) = λ[TFL(ei)] + (1 − λ)[Tδ1/2 + T (1 − δ1)FH(ei)] − ei
Πi(H, ei) = λ[Tδ1/2 + T (1 − δ1)FL(ei)] + (1 − λ)[Tδ2/2 + T (1 − δ2)FH(ei)] − ei
(3.2)
where Fcj (ei) is the cumulative distribution conditional on the choice on firm j’s
investment level cj ∈ {H, L}. λ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of choosing the low investment
level L.
3.3 Mixed Strategies
The first observation we make in Lemmas 6 and 7 is that firm use mixed strategies in
effort and investment.
Lemma 6. Firms use mixed strategies in effort (ei).
Proof. The proof of the lemma is straightforward and similar as, for example, Baye
et al. (1996) which shows that both firms use a continuous mixed bidding strategy
in all pay auctions. Consider a candidate equilibrium with pure strategies in effort
(ei, ej) and (pure or mixed) strategies in investment (ci, cj). First, if ei < ej, there is a
profitable deviation for firm j to a slightly lower effort level e′ ∈ (ei, ej), which reduces
its costs without affecting its winning probability. Second, if ei = ej, there is a profitable
deviation for firm i to a marginally higher effort level e′ > ej, increasing its probability
of winning from 1/2 to δ(ci, cj)12 + 1 − δ(ci, cj), with only a slight positive effect on its
cost. This shows that there is no equilibrium where firms apply pure strategies in effort.
Lemma 7. Firms use mixed strategies in investment (ci).
Proof. We prove by contradiction. To begin, suppose that firms apply pure
strategies (ci, cj) = (L, L). The game becomes a standard all-pay auction. Thus, ei = 0
is within the support of a firm’s optimal strategy in the tentative equilibrium. The
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choice of (ei, ci) = (ε, L) yields the firm the payoff of Fj(ε)Ti − ε → 0, as ε → 0 and Fj(ε)
represents the probability that firm i wins as effort ε goes to 0. However, by choosing
instead (ei, ci) = (ε, H) (zero effort together with higher investment), the firm obtains
a payoff of Ti(δ(H, L)/2 + (1 − δ)Fj(ε)) − ε → Tiδ(H, L)/2, as ε → 0 and Fj(ε) → 0,
which is strictly larger. This constitutes a profitable deviation. 13
Next, suppose that firms apply pure strategies (ci, cj) = (H, H). Firm i’s expected
profit is given by
Πi(ci, cj, ei) = Πi(H, H, ei) = Ti[δ2
1
2 + (1 − δ2)FH(ei)] − ei
where FH(ei) is the cumulative distribution when firm j chooses cj = H and firm i’s
effort ei is continuous in the support. If δ2 = 1, firm i obtains the maximum profit T2
at ei = 0. A deviation to (c′i, cj) = (L, H) results in the change in the difficulty level
from δ2(H, H) to δ1(L, H). Consider a small positive effort level e′i > ei = 0 such that
FH(e′i) > 0. To be a profitable deviation, the following inequality has to be satisfied.
Π′i(c′i, cj, e′i) = Π′i(L, H, e′i) = Ti[δ1
1




2 = Πi(ci, cj, ei)
⇒ e′i <
T
2 (1 − δ1)
For any δ1, there exists some e′i > 0 such that the last inequality is satisfied. Therefore
the candidate pure strategy (ci, cj) = (H, H) cannot be an equilibrium.
If δ2 < 1, suppose the candidate equilibrium effort is ei. As with the above arguments,
we consider a slightly higher effort e′i > ei = 0 and c′i = L that generates the profit
Π′i(c′i, cj, e′i) = Π′i(L, H, e′i) = Ti[δ1
1
2 + (1 − δ1)FH(e
′





Π′i(c′i, cj, e′i) > Πi(ci, cj, ei)
iff




2 + (1 − δ2)FH(ei)] − ei
13The proof holds for both symmetric and asymmetric case. For T1 = T2, firms use mixed strategy





2(δ1 + δ2) − 1 − (1 − δ2)FH(ei)] < e
′
i − ei < 0
⇒ 12(δ1 + δ2) − 1 − (1 − δ2)FH(ei)] < 0
Since FH(ei) in monotonically increasing in ei, we only need to check whether the
last expression holds at the boundary. When FH(ei) = 0, we get δ1 + δ2 < 2. When
FH(ei) = 1, we get δ1 + 3δ2 < 4. That is to say, for any FH(ei) ∈ [0, 1], there exists a
slightly higher effort level e′i > ei, such that FH(e′i) = 1 and Π′i(e′i) > Πi(ei).
Last, suppose that firms apply pure strategies where only one firm chooses high
investment, that is, (ci, cj) = (H, L). Suppose the candidate equilibrium effort is ei that
generates
Πi(ci, cj, ei) = Πi(H, L, ei) = Ti[δ1
1
2 + (1 − δ1)FL(ei)] − ei.
Consider a slightly higher effort e′i > ei and c′i = L such that
Π′i(c′i, cj, e′i) = Πi(L, L, e′i) = Ti[δ0
1
2 + (1 − δ0)FL(e
′
i)] − e′i = Ti − e′i.
Π′i(c′i, e′i) > Πi(ci, ei)
iff
Ti − e′i > Ti[δ1
1
2 + (1 − δ1)FL(ei)] − ei,
that is
1
2δ1 + (1 − δ1)FL(ei) − 1 < 0.
For the same reason as above, we check the boundary. Since the last equality is satisfied
when FL(ei) = 0 and FL(ei) = 1, it completes the proof. There is no pure investing
strategy equilibrium.14
The intuition for Lemma 7 is as follows. Firms use mixed strategies in CSR
investment because choosing ci = L allows a firm to intensify competition (reduce δ)
when its PR spending is relatively higher (closer to the upper bound of equilibrium
expenditure e); whereas choosing ci = H enables a firm to alleviate competition (elevate
14There is a pure equilibrium in CSR investment if and only if δ1 = δ2. The equilibrium strategies
are (c1, c2) = (H, H).
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δ) when its PR spending is relatively lower (more close to the lower bound of equilibrium
expenditure e). Both options are thus valuable for a firm but in different situations. We
find that, since firms use mixed strategies in PR expenditures ei over the same support
[e, e] as Lamma 6 proves, they must use mixed strategies in their CSR investments ci
as well.
In the case where no CSR investment is made, i.e., both firms choose ci = L for
i = 1, 2, the contest reduces to an all-pay auction where at least one firm makes zero
expected profit. It competes away its profits in the contest.15 In the case where at least
one firm invests in CSR, firms may reduce the spending on PR and benefit from the
authority’s difficulty in choosing the winner. Both firm expect positive profits. Thus,
the incentive to alleviate competition by investing in CSR with a positive probability
arises.
Further, note that our assumptions on payoffs also entail that the contest success
function in Eq. (3.1) corresponds to that in a contest with a winning prize of size
Wi = Ti(1 − δ/2) and a consolation prize of size Ci = Tiδ/2, which is positive if δ is
positive. The winning prize is given by Ti(1 − δ) = Wi − Ci = W − Tiδ/2, resulting in
the following payoff function
Πi = Ci + (Wi − Ci) Fj(ei) − ei.
Technically, this explains why investing in CSR, which gives rise to a positive δ,
alleviates competition in contests. In the contest literature, e.g., Barut and Kovenock
(1998), the availability of a consolation prize is known to limit competition. Here, CSR
investment by firms introduces a consolation prize, which benefits firms as it guarantees
them higher profits.
3.4 Symmetric contests
Next, we concentrate on a symmetric game where payoffs are the same, T1 = T2 =: T ,
and firms have the same incentives in competing for a contract.
Lemma 8 (Symmetric Contest). In equilibrium, there is a level ei such that a firm
chooses low CSR investment, i.e., ci = L, with higher effort, for ei > ei , and high CSR
15The arguments are the same as in, for example, Ellingsen (1991), p. 650.
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investment, i.e., ci = H, with lower effort, for ei < ei .
Proof. We denote the range associated with the low investment at the equilibrium
as SL = [eL, eL] and the range associated with high as SH = [eH , eH ]. We prove in four
steps.
1. SL ∩ SH = ∅
We prove by contradiction. a) Suppose, at equilibrium, eL > eH > 0 so that
SL ∩ SH = ∅, from Equation (3.2), we get FH(eL) = 1, ∀eL ∈ SL. By choosing
ci = L and ei = eL, firm i obtains the profit Πi(L, eL) = (1 − λ)Ti(1 − δ1/2) − eL
by FL(eL) = 0. The profit is positive only if firm j chooses the investment H.
Firm i can do better by deviating to e′ = eL − ε > eH where ε > 0.
b) Suppose eH > eL > 0, we get FH(eL) = 0, ∀eL ∈ SL. By choosing ci = L and
ei = eL, firm i obtains the profit Πi(L, eL) = (1 − λ)Tiδ1/2 − eL. The firm can do
better by choosing H instead and thus gets Π(H, eL) = λTiδ1/2 + (1 − λ)Tδ2/2 −
eL > Π(L, eL).
2. min{eL, eH} = 0
Suppose not. min{eL, eH} = eL = e > 0, for any F (e) = 0, there would be a
profitable deviation e′ < e s.t. F (e′) = 0 and U(e) < U(e′) < 0 for positive e′ and
U(e′) = 0 for e′ = 0.
3. SL ∩ SH = {e} for some e
Suppose SL ∩ SH = [e, e], then for any e ∈ [e, e], the indifference condition
Π(L, e) = Π(H, e) should hold.
λ[TiFL(e)] + (1 − λ)[Tiδ1/2 + Ti(1 − δ1)FH(e)] − e
= λ[Tiδ1/2 + Ti(1 − δ1)FL(e)] + (1 − λ)[Tiδ2/2 + Ti(1 − δ2)FH(e)] − e
FL(e){λδ1} + C = FH(e){(1 − δ2)(δ1 − δ2)}.
where C = 12(δ1 − 2λδ1 − (1 − λ)δ2) does not depend on e. Since FL(e) and FH(e)
increase in e, LHS is increasing in e while RHS is decreasing. Contradiction.
4. SH = [eH , ê] and SL = [ê, eL]
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Suppose not. SL = [eL, ê] and SH = [ê, eH ]. Clearly eL must be zero. A
firm’s profit from choosing low investment L and low effort eL is Π(L, eL) =
(1 − λ)T (1 − δ1/2) − eL by FL(eL) = FH(eL) = 0. It only obtains positive profit
if the other firm chooses high investment H. Now consider a deviation to (H, eL).
Π(H, eL) = λTiδ1/2 + (1 − λ)Tδ2/2 − eL > Π(L, eL). It is a profitable deviation.
Contradiction.
Therefore we show that at equilibrium, SH = [eH , ê] = [0, ê] and SL = [ê, eL]. Note that
the arguments hold for T1 = T2 and we will use this result in Section 3.5 to solve the
asymmetric case.
Now we derive the mixed strategy equilibrium. The probability of choosing low
investment L, λ, is given by the indifference condition Π(L, ê) = Π(H, ê). By FL(ê) = 0
and FH(ê) = 1, we get
λ[TFL(ê)] + (1 − λ)[Tδ1/2 + T (1 − δ1)FH(ê)] − ê =
λ[Tδ1/2 + T (1 − δ1)FL(ê)] + (1 − λ)[Tδ2/2 + T (1 − δ2)FH(ê)] − ê
⇒ λ = (δ2 − δ1)/δ2 and 1 − λ = δ1/δ2 (3.3)
Plug λ in Π(H, eH), we solve the equilibrium payoff
Π(H, eH) = Π(H, 0) = λTδ1/2 + (1 − λ)Tδ2/2 − eH
= Tδ1(δ2 − δ1)/(2δ2) + Tδ1/2 > 0
We compare the payoff to that of Ellingsen (1991), which generates zero expected profit,
and find that a firm obtains a higher profit by investing in CSR related matters. The
upper bound of SH , ê, is given by Π(H, ê) = Π(H, 0).
λTδ1/2 + (1 − λ)T (1 − δ2/2) − ê = λTδ1/2 + (1 − λ)Tδ2/2 − eH
⇒ ê = (1 − λ)T (1 − δ2) = δ1/δ2T (1 − δ2). (3.4)
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The upper bound of SL, eL, is given by Π(L, eL) = Π(L, ê) = Π(H, ê) = Π(H, 0).
λT + (1 − λ)T (1 − δ2/2) − eL
= λTδ1/2 + (1 − λ)Tδ2/2 − eH
⇒ eL = T (1 − δ1). (3.5)
The effort distribution associated with high investment, FH(e), is given by Π(H, e) =
Π(H, eH) and FL(e) = 0.
λTδ1/2 + (1 − λ){Tδ2/2 + T (1 − δ2)FH(e)} − e
= λTδ1/2 + (1 − λ)Tδ2/2 − eH
⇒ FH(e) = e(1 − λ)T (1 − δ2) =
eδ2
δ1T (1 − δ2) . (3.6)
The effort distribution associated with low investment, FL(e), is given by Π(L, e) =
Π(H, eH) and FH(e) = 1.
λ[TFL(e)] + (1 − λ)[Tδ1/2 + T (1 − δ1)] − e
= λTδ1/2 + (1 − λ)Tδ2/2 − eH
⇒ FL(e) = e − T + λT + δ1T − λTδ1/2
λT
= δ1T − δ2(e + δ1T )(δ1 − δ2)T . (3.7)
Proposition 4. In the symmetric contest where the winning prize T1 = T2, there exists
a unique symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium in the rent seeking game, where two
identical firms choose the low investment in CSR projects with probability λ that is given
by
λ = (δ2 − δ1)/δ2
and apply the mixed strategies in effort that are given by
FH(e) =
eδ2
δ1T (1 − δ2)
and
FL(e) =
δ1T − δ2(e + δ1T )
(δ1 − δ2)T .
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As a numerical example, we set T = 20, δ1 = 0.3, δ2 = 0.5 and report the effort
distributions conditional on the investments in Figure 3.1. It shows that high investments
Figure 3.1: Effort distributions associated with High and Low CSR investment level
and homogeneous winning prizes
FL(e), FH(e)
(in blue) are associated with low efforts and low investments (in orange) are associated
with high efforts. Firms uses mixed strategies in effort and the upper bound is far
below the value of the winning prize 20. It suggests that with the introduction of the
investment in CRS related matters, the lobbying costs are lower than that in a standard
lobbying contest.
3.5 Asymmetric contests
In this section, we study asymmetric contests where two firms with different valuations
for the winning prize compete for a contract. We consider a competition between a
large (efficient) firm and a small (inefficient) firm. As in the symmetric case, both firms
make a positive profit only when the authority has difficulty in choosing a more suitable
winner, which is the case if at least one firm invests in CSR projects.
In a lobbying contest where T1 > T2, denote the effort strategies of firm 1 and firm 2
by F1 and F2, respectively. These cumulative distribution functions Fi(ei) are increasing
in ei > 0 and continuous in the support [ei, ei], for firm i ∈ {1, 2}. If there exists any
equilibrium, as proved in Lemma 8, the equilibrium must have the following properties.
Lemma 9 (Asymmetric Contest).
(1) there exists ei ∈ [ei, ei] s.t. ci = L for ei ≥ ei and ci = H for ei < ei , i ∈ {1, 2}
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(2) e1 = e2 = 0
(3) e1 = e2 > 0
(4) F1(0)F2(0) = 0
The first item in the lemma tells that the firm with high effort would choose low
investment and vice versa. For firm i that chooses low investment, the effort is in the
range of [ei, ei ) and for high investment, is in the range of [ei , ei]. When two firm
chooses the investment levels (c1, c2) = (L, L), both obtain the expected profits
TiFj(ei) − ei, i = j
where the lower bound ei for both firms must be zero as in standard all pay auctions.
Otherwise we can easily find profitable deviation. When two firms choose the investment
levels (c1, c2) = (H, H), both obtain the expected profit
Tiδ2/2 + Ti(1 − δ2)Fj(ei) − ei, i = j
The upper bound ei for both firms must be the same. Otherwise one firm can deviate
to a slight higher effort level e′ that ensures a higher expected profit by F (e′) = 1. The
last lemma tells that one and only one firm would choose zero effort with zero possibility.
We will soon show that it is the firm with high valuation. And for its competitor, the
lower the valuation is, the more unlikely it is to choose zero effort.
We construct an equilibrium that satisfies the above lemmas. We then show the
equilibrium uniqueness by ruling out other candidate equilibria. Start from the case
where e1 ≤ e2. This entails that the profits of firm 2, evaluated at different points, are
given by
Π2 = T2[F1(e2) (δ2/2 + (1 − δ2)) + (F1(e1) − F1(e2)) (δ2/2) + (1 − F1(e1)) (δ1/2)] − e2,
for e2 < e1 (3.8)
Π2 = T2[F1(e1) (δ2/2 + (1 − δ2)) + (F1(e2) − F1(e1)) (δ1/2 + (1 − δ1))
+ (1 − F1(e2)) (δ1/2)] − e2,
for e2 ∈ [e1, e2) (3.9)
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Π2 = T2[F1(e1) (δ1/2 + (1 − δ1)) + (F1(e2) − F1(e1)) (δ0/2 + (1 − δ0))
+ (1 − F1(e2)) (δ0/2)] − e2,
for e2 ≥ e2 (3.10)
Likewise, the profit of firm 1 evaluated at different points of the support of the effort
distribution is given by
Π1 = T1[F2(e1) (δ2/2 + (1 − δ2)) + (F2(e2) − F2(e1)) (δ2/2) + (1 − F2(e2)) (δ1/2)] − e1,
for e1 < e1 (3.11)
Π1 = T1[F2(e1) (δ1/2 + (1 − δ1)) + (F2(e2) − F2(e1)) (δ1/2) + (1 − F2(e2)) (δ0/2)] − e1,
for e1 ∈ [e1, e2) (3.12)
Π1 = T1[F2(e2) (δ1/2 + (1 − δ1)) + (F2(e1) − F2(e2)) (δ0/2 + (1 − δ0))
+ (1 − F2(e1)) (δ0/2)] − e1,
for e1 ≥ e2 (3.13)
To solve for ei , we note that the equilibrium profits should be the same at ei − ε
and ei + ε, where ε > 0 and ε → 0. Equating the profits of firm 2 in Equations (3.9)
and (3.10) results in
F1(e1) (δ2/2 + (1 − δ2) − δ1/2 − (1 − δ1))
+ (F1(e2) − F1(e1)) (δ1/2 + (1 − δ1) − δ0/2 − (1 − δ0))
+ (1 − F1(e2)) (δ1/2 − δ0/2)] = 0 (3.14)
where F1(e1) is given by Equation (3.9)
Π2 = T2[F1(e1) (δ2/2 + (1 − δ2)) + (1 − F1(e1)) (δ1/2)] − e1
⇒ F1(e1) =
−2e1 − 2Π2 + δ1T2
(−2 + δ1 + δ2)T2 ,
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and F1(e2) is given by Equation (3.10)
Π2 = T2[F1(e1) (δ1/2 + (1 − δ1))
+ (F1(e2) − F1(e1)) (δ0/2 + (1 − δ0))
+ (1 − F1(e2)) (δ0/2)] − e2
⇒ F1(e2) =
2e2 + 2Π2 − δ1T2 − δ1F1(e1)T2 + δ2F1(e1)T2
2T2 − 2δ1T2 .
Equating the profits of firm 1 in Equations (3.11) and (3.12) gives
F2(e1) (δ2/2 + (1 − δ2) − δ1/2 − (1 − δ1))
+ (F2(e2) − F2(e1)) (δ2/2 − δ1/2)
+ (1 − F2(e2)) (δ1/2 − δ0/2) = 0 (3.15)
where F2(e2) is given by Equation (3.13)
Π1 = T1[F2(e2) (δ1/2 + (1 − δ1)) + (1 − F2(e2)) (δ0/2)] − e2
⇒ F2(e2) = −
2(e2 + Π1)
(−2 + δ1)T1 ,
and F2(e1) is given by Equation (3.12)
Π1 = T1[F2(e1) (δ1/2 + (1 − δ1)) + (F2(e2) − F2(e1)) (δ1/2) + (1 − F2(e2)) (δ0/2)] − e1
⇒ F2(e1) =
2e1 + 2Π1 − δ1T1 + δ1F2(e2)T1 − δ2F2(e2)T1
2T1 − 2δ2T1 .
By δ0 = 0, solving the system of linear equations (3.14) and (3.15), we get the solution
for e1 and e2.
e1 = e1(T1, T2, Π1, Π2, δ1, δ2)
= {2δ22Π2 − 2δ1δ2[(−2 + δ2)Π1 + 2Π2 + T2] + δ41(−T1 + T2) − δ31[(−4 + δ2)T1 + 4T2]
+ δ21(−4T1 + 4T2 + δ2(−2Π1 + 2Π2 + 2T1 + T2))}/{2(−1 + δ1)δ22} (3.16)
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e2 = e2(T1, T2, Π1, Π2, δ1, δ2)
= {−2δ22(Π1 − 2Π2) + δ41(−T1 + T2) − 2δ1δ2(−2Π1 + (2 + δ2)Π2 − T1 + 2T2)
+ δ21(−4T1 − δ2(2Π1 − 2Π2 + T1 − 4T2) + 4T2)
+ δ31(4T1 − (4 + δ2)T2)}/[2(−1 + δ1)δ22] (3.17)
We also know that the equilibrium profits must be the same at ei = 0 and at ei = e.
For firm 1, this yields
Π1(0) = Π1(e)






2) − F2(0)) + (1 − δ2/2)F2(0))
= T1((1 − δ0/2)(1 − F2(e2)) + (1 − δ1/2)F2(e2)) − e (3.18)
And for firm 2, we have
Π2(0) = Π2(e)






1) − F1(0)) + (1 − δ2/2)F1(0)]
= T2[(1 − δ0/2)(1 − F1(e1)) + (1 − δ1/2)F1(e1)] − e (3.19)
By δ0 = 0, we simply the last equation.
2e + (−2 + δ1 + δ2F1(e1) + 2F1(0) − 2δ2F1(0))T2 = 0 (3.20)
Knowing that Lemma 9 must hold in equilibrium, we show that there is an
equilibrium under the conditions F1(0) = 0 and F2(0) > 0.16 Equation (3.20) is
further simplified as
e = −12(−2 + δ1 + δ2F1(e

1))T2. (3.21)
16We check the existence of equilibrium under three other conditions: 1) e1 ≤ e2, F1(0) > 0 and
F2(0) = 0; 2) e1 > e2, F1(0) > 0 and F2(0) = 0; and 3) e1 > e2, F1(0) = 0 and F2(0) > 0. We prove
that there is no equilibrium in these cases. The proofs are available upon request.
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Plugging this into Equation (3.18), we get
F2(0) =
−2T1 + δ0T1 + δ1T1 − δ0F2(e2)T1 + δ2F2(e2)T1 + 2T2 − δ1T2 − δ2F1(e1)T2
2(−1 + δ2)T1
(3.22)
We plug Equations (3.16), (3.17), (3.21) and (3.22) into (3.14) and (3.15), and get
the solution to the equilibrium profits Π1 and Π2
Π1 = [1 − 2δ1 − δ31/δ22 + (5δ21)/(2δ2)]T1 + [−1 + 3δ1 + δ31/δ22 − (3δ21)/δ2]T2 (3.23)
Π2 = −δ1[2δ
2





δ1(−1 + δ2)(−2δ1T1 + 2δ2T1 + 2δ1T2 − 3δ2T2)
δ22
(3.25)
e2 = T1 −
δ21(−2 + δ2)(T1 − T2)
δ22
















δ1(2δ1T1 − 2δ2T1 − 2δ1T2 + 3δ2T2)
δ22T2
(3.30)
Therefore, plugging Equations (3.23)–(3.30) into (3.8) and (3.11), we get the effort










1 ≤ e < e2
δ21(T1−T2)+δ2(e−δ1T1+2δ1T2)
δ2T2
for e ≥ e2
(3.31)
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1 ≤ e < e2
δ21(T1−T2)+δ2(e+T1−δ1T1−T2+2δ1T2)
δ2T1
for e ≥ e2
(3.32)
As a numerical example, we set T1 = 20, T2 = 19, δ1 = 0.3, δ2 = 0.5. We get the
effort distributions for e1 and e2 as illustrated in figure 3.2. The effort distributions
F1(·) and F2(·) monotonically increase from zero to the upper bound e = 13.42 which
is much lower than both firm’s valuations. in the interval [e1, e1) = [0, 5.46), firm 1
selects high investment; otherwise it selects low. In the interval [e2, e2) = [0, 5.75), firm
2 selects high investment and low otherwise. Furthermore, firm 2, which profits less
from winning, spends nothing with a strictly positive probability. An increase in T2
would change the graphs in two ways: 1) Firm 2’s probability of spending nothing F2(0)
decreases. 2) The cutoff point e2 moves towards e1. In the case where two firms have
the same valuations T1 = T2, the two graphs overlap, as they should.
We find that the more efficient firm lobbies more and invests less in CSR.This is
intuitive once we observe that the more efficient firm gains more from winning. Higher
payoff makes the firm compete more strongly, increasing its probability of winning the
contract. Lobbying is a more competitive PR strategy than CSR investment in our
game. In equilibrium, the firm faces a tradeoff between efficiency (winning more often)
and rent extraction/dissipation (saving on costs) which it has to solve in choosing how
much to invest in CSR.
We prove the equilibrium uniqueness in three steps. First, we find the support of
candidate equilibria. Second, in the support, we construct one equilibrium. Third,
holding the basic settings unchanged, we rule out other possibilities. Since we have
already completed the first two steps and prove the existence of an mixed strategy
equilibrium. Now we check other candidate equilibria. More precisely, We duplicate
the above analysis and test the equilibrium existence under following conditions: 1)
e1 ≤ e2, F1(0) > 0 and F2(0) = 0; 2) e1 > e2, F1(0) > 0 and F2(0) = 0; and 3) e1 > e2,
F1(0) = 0 and F2(0) > 0. In all these cases, there exists contradiction.17 Thus we prove
there is no other equilibrium in the support [0, e]. The equilibrium we constructed
17The analysis is completed with the help of Mathematica and available upon request.
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above is the unique mixed strategy equilibrium in the support.
3.6 Discussion
Next, we discuss some immediate extensions of our analysis.
3.6.1 Procurement with Competition in Prices
So far we have assumed that firms compete by spending money in lobbying or CSR
to make themselves more competitive in a market for government contracts. Yet,
one of the main motivations for using a public tender to determine the recipient of
a government contract is that of economizing on costs of provision. In those cases,
a firm’s proposal usually consists of a price offer pi together with some background
information on delivery conditions and investments in CSR, etc.
Then, we can still think that a firm chooses how much to invest in winning the
contest, i.e, e, and then whether to invest this (i) into something that is easy for the
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authority to compare, i.e. by offering a low pi, and (ii) into something that is hard
for the authority to compare, i.e., by investing in CSR. By the same logic as before,
investment in CSR relaxes competition and increases prices.
However, because a lower contracting price may allow the government to allocate the
money saved to more productive uses, in terms of welfare the setting is very different
from a lobbying contest where firms’ investments are inefficient. Thus, the government
faces a tradeoff between the price and the importance of the CSR investment. Depending
on which is more efficient, CSR investment by firms or government use of money, socially
responsive procurement can either increase or decrease welfare.
3.6.2 Contests as Markets for Influence
Fudenberg and Tirole (1987) exemplify how the hypothesis of full rent dissipation in a
contest for a monopoly strongly depends on the specific extensive form of the game, e.g.,
contestable markets, war of attrition competition, capacity commitments, etc., which
determines both rent dissipation and the wastefulness of expenditure. The importance
of specifying the strategic variables available to firms is also stressed by Menezes and
Quiggin (2010). They demonstrate that the standard Tullock solution corresponds to
an oligopolistic market equilibrium where firms choose market shares. Previously, Baye
et al. (1996) show that all-pay auctions are isomorphic to models like Varian (1980) for
oligopolistic competition with imperfect information.
Thus, Menezes and Quiggin (2010) argue that being explicit about the strategic
variables available to firms is essential to understand rent dissipation in a contest
because the mode of competition determines what they call the price of influence, i.e.,
the expenditure required to receive the prize. Our paper is an important addition to this
discussion as it describes a setup where firms themselves can determine the intensity of
competition in the market for government contracts by choosing whether to lobby (the
more competitive option) or invest in CSR (the less competitive option). We observe
that firms have incentives to differentiate and obfuscate their lobbying strategies in
order to relax competition and lower the price they need to pay to influence the contest.
66
3.6.3 Desirability of Transparency in Lobbying
Our analysis can also be used to shed more light on the desirability of transparency in
lobbying. Many public acts seek to make lobbying spending more transparent. The
EU transparency register for lobbyists is just one such example. Not without reason,
lobbying is often viewed as a shady realm. The chains of influence in networks of
political connections are typically complicated and the strategies with which interest
groups try to influence decisions can be innovative.18
The shadiness could obviously serve both good and bad purposes. First, by hiding
chains of influence from public eyes and allowing secret dealings, it might allow private
interest groups to bribe politicians and regulators. That is obviously not desirable.
Second, it could make lobbying expenditures/political contributions harder to compare,
e.g., if they are very different in nature or if they come through different sources. The
effects of this kind of shadiness may not be that worrisome.
As discussed in the earlier section, lobbying is just a form of selling: not to consumers
but to politicians or regulators. As in consumer markets, lobbyists have incentives to
economize on costs by obfuscating their lobbying strategies. We have shown that, in
so far that lobbying is wasteful, this is actually welfare improving. In other words, as
long as the shadiness reduces lobbying competition, it should not be a concern for a
benevolent politician. Then, only the politician who is afraid of losing his/her bribes
should be worried. Interestingly, statistics show that lobbying expenditure doubled
in 1998–2008, from $1.45 to $3.3 Billion in the US, at the same time as technological
progress increased transparency.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how socially responsible procurement affects the money that
firms allocate to influence the outcome of a public procurement contest, modeled as an
all-pay auction. This is a topical question because different authorities all over the world
have recently established guidelines for socially responsible procurement. In the model,
firms can try to increase their competitiveness in the market for government contracts
18 As described by Vining et al. (2005), a firm’s PR or lobbying strategy is a multi-dimensional
object comprising the choice of (1) the jurisdictional venue(s); (2) the organizational target(s), (3)
cooperation between lobbies, (4) the argument(s) used, (5) the delivery mode(s), etc.
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both directly by lobbying and by investing in corporate social responsibility (CSR).
CSR investments could take many forms (e.g., corporate governance vs. environmental
investments) making them harder to compare for the government authority than
lobbying spending. As a result, we find that CSR can act as an effective differentiation
strategy for firms competing for a contract.
In particular, the paper shows that socially responsible procurement (i) alleviates
the competition among firms for government contracts, (ii) shifts firms’ public relations
spending from lobbying to CSR investment, and (iii) decreases the total amount of
money that a firm spends to influence the authority. This is welfare improving in so far
that lobbying spending is socially wasteful. The analysis also helps to weigh the pros and
cons of socially responsible procurement when a public tender is made to reduce public
spending, rationalizes firms’ incentives to differentiate their PR and lobbying strategies,
and sheds new light on the desirability and beneficiaries of transparency in lobbying.
Socially responsible procurement may elevate public spending and transparency may
increase rents to political office.
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Appendix: Analysis of Winning Probabilities
We measure the winning probability in the asymmetric case and compare it with a
standard asymmetric all-pay-auction. In a standard asymmetric all-pay-auction where
firm 1 has a higher winning prize, the firms’ equilibrium strategies are
F1(e) = e/T2
F2(e) = 1 − T2/T1 + e/T1








(e/T2)d(1 − T2/T1 + e/T1) = T22T1 .
Now we find the winning probabilities when firms can choose CSR investment and
lobbying simultaneously.
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Advantage and Free Riding
Incentives in Uneven Wars of
Attrition 1
4.1 Introduction
A firm lacking awareness of corporate social responsibility and deviating from generally
accepted social norms may be boycotted by consumers (Fehr and Fischbacher (2004)).
Boycotts can be launched and influenced by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
or, more commonly, non-organized voluntary consumer activism. 2
Sometimes the boycotting group wins: the targeted firms are ‘forced’ to behave
in a way that benefits the interests of the boycotters. However, surprisingly, most of
1This chapter is based on an article publish on the Eurasian Economic Review Zheng (2019).The
author would like to thank the Editor and two anonymous reviewers.
2There are many underlying causes of boycott activity, for example, inappropriate promotion
of infant formula in developing countries (Nestlé), war (limiting trade with Russia due to Ukraine),
political reasons (US boycott of French wine 2003), protecting a river delta (Shell Oil), Soviet violations
of human rights and invasion of Afghanistan (1980 Summer Olympics), abuse of monopoly power
(Microsoft), unfair wages (Delano grape), production of genetically modified organisms (Monsanto),
child labour (Nike and Lush’s supply chain in Jharkand, India), animal rights (KFC), products with
unacceptable slogans (Abercrombie & Fitch in USA), destroying agricultural farms, greenhouses,
ancient olive groves (Caterpillar’s D-9 bulldozers in Palestine), conserving energy and reducing carbon
emissions (the Close the Door campaign in UK), continuing rise of food prices (Cottage cheese in Israel),
climate change denial and lack of investment in renewable energy (Esso/ExxonMobil), Deepwater
Horizon oil spill (BP) and more recently, location of factory (Oreo) and independence (SodaStream),
just to list a few.
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the time boycotts fail. This is so even when the number of participating boycotters is
initially large. There are some clear difficulties for boycotts. First, a pure profit-driven
firm may act without much concern for social norms. By being ‘patient’ enough, a
firm can simply ignore boycotters’ behaviour and the potential damage to its corporate
image and reputation as long as its financial loss remains at an acceptable level. Second,
the free riding problem exists. Since the success of a boycott generally does not require
the contribution of all consumers in the market, each self-interested individual thus,
more or less, has incentives to free ride on the collective actions of other boycotters.
Third, the non-consistency of boycotters’ behaviour limits the financial and reputational
damage to the misbehaving firm. In most of the cases, only very few consumers stop
purchasing from the non-ethical firm ‘permanently’ (before boycott success is achieved).
Many boycotters may not continuously fight against the firm for a long time, which
limits the real boycotting power. Consumers may act as if they are ‘forgiving’ the
unethical firm, which is in fact driven by selfishness and free ride incentives. Fourth,
there are the non-commitment and non-binding features. Boycotting as a consumer’s
independent choice is not under any binding obligations. It implies the great difficulty,
in fact almost impossibility, of coordinating boycotts. Fifth, threatening to boycott
has limited boycott power. Even if the boycotting is organized by some NGOs, it is
more of a ‘threat to boycott’ rather than ‘physical boycotting activity’. The firm may
view consumers’ threats as cheap talk. Last but not least, the ongoing boycott may
turn out to be harmless. The consistency of a few consumers’ boycotting behavior does
not necessarily achieve any good outcomes. An unethical firm can ignore this group
— if there was indeed sufficient boycotting power that leads to a huge profit loss, the
firm would have already changed its behavior in the first place. The firm only becomes
more ‘patient’ and ‘persistent’ to fight against the ongoing boycotters over time with
the hope of obtaining their potential ‘forgiveness’.
In this paper, we develop a non-cooperative game between a profit driven firm that
lacks social responsibility and a number of potential boycotters who have environmental
concerns. We try to address the following questions: on the demand side, which incentive
dominates the consumer’s behaviour, moral concern (to boycott and do the right thing)
or selfishness (not to boycott and focus on the subjective utility maximising)? Why do
some consumers act like strict environmentalists (are willing to boycott with fighting
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costs for a long time) while others act like loyal supporters of the product (never
participate in boycotts or boycott for a short period)? And on the supply side, does
the size of firm, i.e., the number of potential boycotters that the firm serves, matter,
and if so, to what extent?
Our model extends Maynard Smith (1974)’s classic two-contestant game of war
of attrition. We introduce free riding incentives and alliance advantages to players
on the demand side. Consumers form a weak alliance to fight against a misbehaving
monopolist. Siding with the boycotters/alliance is cost-free but potentially beneficial.
No commitment to fully cooperate is required. Meanwhile, a prize may be awarded
to a free riding consumer even without providing a personal contribution. We allow a
prize to a successful free rider if the game eventually ends with his ally’s success. Each
consumer wishes to obtain a prize with less effort.
We start from a two-against-one game. By comparing the mixed strategy equilibrium
in our model to that of a classic two-contestant game, we examine the effect of the third
player’s intervention. We discuss how consumers behave in the presence of potential
support from the alliance and how the firm deals with it. We then let the number of
players on the demand side increase to infinitely large. We find a unique mixed strategy
equilibrium in the n-against-one game. We derive optimal strategies for both sides at
the limit.
Our results explain the difficulty of winning a non-organized boycott in reality. On
the demand side, we find that the consumers’ free riding incentives dominate their
behaviours and therefore limit the real boycott power. The larger the market the
firm serves, the more likely an individual consumer would surrender, which leaves
fewer boycotters remaining in the costly conflict. We therefore explain the reason
why some consumers act like loyal supporters of the product while others act like
strict environmentalists. On the supply side, we show that the market size does
not significantly affect the firm’s strategies. The polluting firm would change its
misbehaviour with slightly higher probability in a large economy. For a large monopolist
that serves infinitely many consumers, boycott will surely be effective, that is, non-zero
participation, but hardly successful, that is, lead to the firm’s cessation of misbehaviour.3
Wars of attrition have been studied both theoretically and empirically by many
3In Craig Smith (1990), a boycott is ‘effective’ if there is non-zero participation and ‘successful’ if
it leads to the cessation of the egregious act.
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economists and social scientists after Maynard Smith (1974). However, only limited
attention has been paid to the influence of a third contestant’s contribution in a war of
attrition framework taking account of alliance advantage and incentive to free ride. The
closest studies to ours are Haigh and Cannings (1989); Bulow and Klemperer (1999)
and Helgesson and Wennberg (2015), which discuss n players competing for one or
several prizes. Powell (2017) discusses the third party effects on a two-player game by
allowing a third party to take sides and provide endogenous intervention to one of the
two actors. He studies the case where a third party chooses a time to support one side
after a conflict starts. Therefore at the time of joining the game, the third party already
forms a belief on the existing players’ ability/strength ordering, the potential winning
party and the expected length of the conflict. In this paper, we analyze a game within a
game where the boycotters play a prisoners’ dilemma against each other and meanwhile
they form a weak alliance and play a war of attrition against the polluting firm.
Our research may also be linked with the literature on evolutionary games (see, e.g.
Maynard Smith and Price (1973) and Laruelle et al. (2018)). Several papers studied
boycotts, cooperation, punishment and environmental compliance (da Silva Rocha and
Salomão (2019)) or more general punishment and cooperation games (da Silva Rocha
et al. (2015) and da Silva Rocha (2017)) using an evolutionary game setting. In these
papers rational behaviour is partially relaxed and the dynamic nature of the evolutionary
game is analysed. In our paper, we employ a repeat game and assume players to be
fully rational. Our model can be potentially extended to a two-population game where
consumers’ types and preferences change based on the interaction with other boycotters.
Several articles study consumer boycotts in different settings. Friedman (1991);
Delacote (2008) provide conceptual discussion on boycott actions. Tyran and Engelmann
(2005) provide an experiment on boycotts in reaction to a sudden cost increase in retail
markets. They find that the cost increases the incidence of boycotts. Boycotts reduce
market efficiency. Innes (2006) develops a model where two non-identical duopolists face
a threat to boycott from an environmental organization. He finds that at equilibrium a
small persistent boycott will work against the small firm or a large transitory boycott will
work against the large firm. This implies larger firms are easier to defeat. Baron (2001)
employs a game between an influential activist and a monopolist that is concerned about
profit maximisation, altruism and activist’s powerful threats. From a psychological
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perspective, John and Klein (2003) explain consumers’ boycotting incentives and
willingness to sacrifice. Heijnen and van der Made (2012) find that in a market under
asymmetric information where consumers can signal high moral values, consumers
always boycott with positive probability despite free-riding incentives and eventually
result in a firm altering its behaviour. In a war of attrition framework, Peck (2017)
analyzes a game between a monopolist that produces two-period durable goods and
consumers who demand a lower price. He derives both non-boycott equilibrium and
boycott equilibria where a boycott occurs with positive probability. Egorov and Harstad
(2017) develop a boycott game between a public regulator, a misbehaving firm and
activists. They find that in a two-player game without the regulator, ‘private politics’
is beneficial for activists but harmful for firms. Meanwhile, in a three-player game,
‘private politics’ is harmful for activists but beneficial for firms. Our paper contributes
to this literature by demonstrating that even if the benefit of free riding is very small,
it is sufficient enough to undermine the probability of boycott success. We also discuss
how market size affects a firm’s decision making.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we discuss the basic
settings and underlying assumptions in a two-against-one game. The equilibrium results
are in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we consider a general case where one firm fights
against a side of many competitors. When the size increases to infinitely large, the
equilibrium is derived at the limit. Section 4.5 concludes the paper.
4.2 Model
Consider three players in a two-sided game of war of attrition competing for the winning
prize under complete information: two consumers P1 (he) and P2 (she) on the demand
side and one monopolist P3 (it) on the supply side. Consumers form a weak alliance
where individual rewards and losses are determined by their joint actions. Consumers are
identical. They are assumed, unless stated otherwise, to have the same incentives and
play symmetric strategies. Time is discrete. In each period, players move simultaneously.
The action set is binary: ai ∈ {F, S}, i = 1, 2, 3 where F and S represent fight and
surrender, respectively. Players have the same prior. P3’s action F is driven by lack of
corporate social responsibility and therefore is viewed as amoral. The complementary
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action S matches the generally accepted social norm and therefore is viewed as moral.
On the demand side, on one hand, driven by moral concern, consumers attempt
to defeat the firm and force it to change its behaviour. On the other hand, selfish
motivation gives rise to a prisoners’ dilemma. Each consumer wishes the other to
contribute more, that is, to allow him/herself to free ride on the alliance benefit. On
the supply side, the firm chooses the best response to the joint action of the consumers.
It wins the conflict only if every consumer is defeated.4
The flow payoffs to the players are summarized in Table 4.1. In each period of a
Table 4.1: A summary of flow payoffs
State-2: one targeted firm VS a weak alliance of two consumers
Active fighters
firm Each consumer
(it) (she or he)
Cost of fighting −m per active consumer −c
Winning prize v w
Probability to quit q(2) p(2)
State-1: one targeted firm VS one remaining consumer
Active fighters
firm Remainer Early quitter / free rider
(it) (i) (−i)
Cost of fighting −m −c 0
Winning prize v w ε
Probability to quit q(1) p(1) 1
a v > 2m > 0, w > c > 0, w > ε > 0 eliminate ‘instant surrender’ equilibrium where either
side or both sides do not bother to fight in the first place.
b State-n represents the state of the game where n demanders remain in the game actively.
two-against-one game, active fighters pay a cost: −c to each consumer and −m per
consumer to the firm. Only one side can win the game and no tie is allowed. The
winning prize is w to each consumer and v to the firm. In the case when all three players
surrender at the same time, each consumer benefits from the firm’s concession and gets
a second winning prize ε.5 Once one and only one consumer surrenders, suppose it
is P2, she becomes an early quitter and is not allowed to return to the conflict. The
game becomes a standard one-against-one war of attrition where the remainer P1 has
4One may argue that in reality the monopoly supplier’s decision may depend on the preferences
and actions of the majority consumers. Thus it would win (or lose) the game if, for example, half of
the consumers surrender (or fight persistently). However, the selection of the winning cutoff point
would not change the main results in this paper.
5The logic of the second winning prize comes from the unevenness of the game. Only consumers
benefit from the supplier’s concession in this case but not vice versa. Consider consumers stop
boycotting and a polluting firm switches to a clean technology at the same time. Consumers receive
the utility from public good (the clean environment) but not from their moral values (concern for
social responsibility and joy from defeating the firm).
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to fight alone against the firm. There is no more fighting cost to P2 after her surrender.
Moreover, we allow her to receive a prize as alliance benefit. If the game eventually
ends with her ally’s success, she gets the second prize ε. If instead the firm is the final
winner, the early quitter, along with the remaining consumer, gets zero. The common
discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1).
The game of war of attrition is as illustrated in Table 4.2. The game is played only
Table 4.2: A game of war of attrition among three players




F (F ) −c, (−c), −2m w, w, 0 [1 − p(2)][1 − p(2)]
F (S) −c, (0), −m w, (ε), 0 [1 − p(2)]p(2)
S(F ) 0, (−c), −m ε, (w), 0 p(2)[1 − p(2)]
S(S) 0, (0), v ε, (ε), 0 p(2)p(2)
1 − q(2) q(2)




F −c, (0), −m w, (ε), 0 1 − p(1)
S 0, (0), v ε, (ε), 0 p(1)
1 − q(1) q(1)
a The actions and payoffs of the other player (P2) in parentheses
in Table (a).
b The payoffs to the early quitter in parentheses in Table (b).
c The stopping probabilities to P1, P2 and P3 are p(n), h(n) and
q(n), respectively, where n = 1, 2 represents the number of the
remaining players on the demand side. P1 and P2 are assumed
to play the same strategy unless stated otherwise.





if P1 and P2 play symmetric strategies. The mixed strategy
equilibrium is (p∗(1), 1, q
∗
(1)) in State-1 if P2 surrenders and the
game continues as a ‘one-against-one’ war of attrition.
e At equilibrium, the continuation values to each active fighting
consumer are α1, α2, α3. In State-1, the continuation values are
α1 to the remaining consumer and α2 to the early quitter. At
equilibrium, the continuation values to P3 are always zero and
therefore not highlighted separately.
once. It stops immediately if either side surrenders or both sides surrender at the same
time. Otherwise the game continues in State-2 if everyone remains, as Table 4.2a shows,
or in State-1 if one of the consumers surrenders, as Table 4.2b shows.
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4.3 Symmetric Equilibrium
We solve the game backwards. We start from State-1 where only one consumer remains
in the game and fights against the firm alone. For a mixed strategy equilibrium to be
possible, the indifference conditions for both active players, the remainer and the firm,
should be satisfied. For the firm P3, in any time t, the utility of fighting for one more
period U3(F ) equals to that of surrendering immediately U3(S).
U3(F ) = U3(S)
⇒ [−m + β1δ][1 − p(1)] + vp(1) = 0
where the continuation value β1 = 0 at equilibrium. Solving the equation we get
p∗(1) =
m
m + v (4.1)
Suppose P2 is the early quitter. The remainer P1 is indifferent between staying in
the conflict for one more period or quitting now.
U1(F ) = U1(S)
⇒ [−c + α1δ][1 − q(1)] + wq(1) = εq(1)
where the continuation value
α1 = [1 − p(1)]U1(F ) + p(1)U1(S) = εq(1) > 0 (4.2)




c − α1δ + w − ε =
B − √B2 − 4cδε
2δε (4.3)




where B = c − ε + δε + w > 0. The continuation value α1 measures the remainer’s
desire to stay in the costly conflict. A positive α1 shows that the player is willing to
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fight continuously even without support from the alliance.
The early quitter P2 stops paying the fighting cost right after her concession.
Meanwhile she may get the second winning prize ε in each period with probability q(1)
which is the alliance’s winning probability. The timing of receiving the prize can be
any t from the period of her surrender to infinity. Therefore her expected utility is
U2 = (0 + ε)q(1) + [1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]δ(0 + ε)q(1) + ...
= εq(1)1 − [1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]δ
=: α2 > 0 (4.4)
The expected utility to surrender measures a consumer’s incentive to free ride. A
positive α2 shows that each consumer on the demand side wishes to free ride on the
benefit of her/his ally’s contribution. Moreover, we find that the following inequality
always holds given that the firm plays a mixed strategy.
α2 > α1 > 0, ∀q(1) ∈ (0, 1)
⇒
incentive to free ride (selfishness)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ui(S)|a−i=F > Ui(F )|a−i=S > Ui(S)|a−i=S = 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
incentive to fight (morality)
, i = 1, 2
The intuition of the last inequality is as follows. In the case where a win for the demand
side does not require every one’s contribution, each consumer hopes to be the only early
quitter and obtains the highest utility Ui(S)|a−i=F , that is, when consumer i surrenders
and the remaining ally fights alone. If a consumer failed to be the first quitter, she/he
would stay in the conflict rather than follow the quitter and obtain the lower utility
Ui(F )|a−i=S. However, the incentive to free ride may lead to an unpleasant result. If
both players quit at the same time, they obtain zero utility. There is de facto ‘no ride’.
Both players may be better off by staying in the conflict longer.





1 − [1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]
}
+ 2[1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]
{








[1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]
}t−1{
1 − [1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]
}
= 1
p(1)[1 − q(1)] + q(1)
Now we move to State-2 in which two consumers actively fight against the firm.
Consumers’ strategies are assumed to be stationary as long as the state of the game
does not change, i.e., before any player concedes. We assume that identical consumers
play symmetric strategies. Analogous to the above, we solve the indifference conditions.
For the firm P3,
U3(F ) = U3(S)
⇒ [−2m + β3δ][1 − p(2)]2 + [−m + β1δ][1 − p(2)]p(2) + [−m + β2δ]p(2)[1 − p(2)]
+v[p(2)]2 = 0
where the continuation values βs = 0 at equilibrium. Since the quitting probability p(2)
is in the range of (0, 1), we get a unique solution to the individual consumer’s quitting
probability
p∗(2) =
−m + √m2 + 2mv
v
(4.5)
For active consumers Pi where i = 1, 2,
Ui(F ) = Ui(S)
⇒ [−c + α3δ][1 − p(2)][1 − q(2)] + [−c + α1δ]p(2)[1 − q(2)] + wq(2)
= [0 + α2δ][1 − p(2)][1 − q(2)] + εq(2)
where at equilibrium, the continuation value is
α3 = [1 − p(2)]Ui(F ) + p(2)Ui(S)




c − δ[−α2 + α3 + (α1 + α2 − α3)p∗(2)]
c − δ[−α2 + α3 + (α1 + α2 − α3)p∗(2)] + w − ε
. (4.7)
Plugging in αs and p∗(2), we find a unique solution to q∗(2). The solution is reported in
the appendix. Therefore in State-2, where two active boycotters remain in the boycott,
there is a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (p∗(2), p∗(2), q∗(2)) where consumers are
assumed to play symmetric stationary strategies.
Proposition 5. There is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium such that each active
boycotter surrenders with probability p∗(n) while the polluting firm surrenders with
probability q∗(n) in State-n where n ∈ {1, 2}. In State-2 where two identical consumers
actively fight against the polluting firm, consumers surrender with probability p∗(2), which
is given by Equation (4.5), and the firm surrenders with probability q∗(2), which is given
by Equation (4.7).
The following results are derived immediately when we compare the equilibrium

















(3) p∗(2) > p∗(1) and
q∗(2) < q
∗
(1) if α3 > α1 + α2
The first Lemma shows that, for the remaining consumer, the free rider’s winning
prize would not affect his own strategy at equilibrium. It is in line with our setting:
players are selfish but not altruistic. Together with the second equation, we know that
the incentive to free ride (selfishness) dominates regardless of how low the potential free
riding benefit is, which is measured by the second winning prize ε, or how strong the
desire to fight (morality) is, which is measured by the first winning prize w. The second
Lemma coincides with the standard war of attrition. The discount factor does not change
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active allies’ strategies at equilibrium. However, it matters to the firm’s strategies as
Equations (4.3) and (4.7) show. The third lemma shows that, comparing the equilibrium
strategies in two states, the players on two sides act differently. Consumers driven by
selfish motivations are more likely to leave the conflict when potential support from the
alliance exists. Soon we will see that their quitting probabilities increase in the size
of the demand side n. Meanwhile, the firm surrenders with slightly lower probability
when facing two players’ challenge if and only if the continuation values satisfy the
condition α3 > α1 + α2. We can provide numerical solutions to the firm’s quitting
probabilities which shows that q(n) may fluctuate with the number of consumers n
around q∗(1) depending on the values we give. Nevertheless it has a clear slowly increasing
trend. The numerical solutions are available upon request.
4.4 A Generalised Case: n-against-one Game
Now we consider a game where the firm is a large polluting firm that serves many
consumers in the market. The game of war of attrition between n consumers and one
firm is as illustrated in Table 4.3. Note that we change some notations as follows. The
actions S(Fk) represent the case where player i surrenders and k consumers fight. The
actions F (Fk−1) represent the joint actions of k active fighting consumers where player i
is among them. In either case, the game will continue in State-k in the next period. We
denote the winning prize to the firm to be v(n) indexed by the number of consumers n.
It is, as before, assumed to be large enough to cover one period of fighting cost. Thus it
ensures the existence of mixed strategy equilibria — the firm would not quit the conflict
in the first period. The prize is tempting enough for the firm to stay in the costly war
of attrition. It is natural to assume that the winning prize for the firm increases in n.
In a large economy, a big firm that serves many consumers would generate more sales
revenue. For simplicity, let v(n) = vn.
As before, we assume that n players on the demand side play symmetric strategy.
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F (Fn−1) −c, −mn w, 0 [1 − p(n)]n
F (Fn−2) −c, −m(n − 1) w, 0 [1 − p(n)]n−1p(n)
... ... ...
F (Fk−1) −c, −mk w, 0 [1 − p(n)]k[p(n)]n−k
... ... ...
F (F0) −c, −m w, 0 [1 − p(n)]1[p(n)]n−1
S(Fn−1) 0, −m(n − 1) ε, 0 [p(n)]1[1 − p(n)]n−1
... ... ...
S(Fk) 0, −mk ε, 0 [p(n)]n−k[1 − p(n)]k
... ... ...
S(F1) 0, −m ε, 0 [p(n)]n−1[1 − p(n)]
S(F0) 0, v ε, 0 [p(n)]n
1 − q(n) q(n)
a The actions of the other players on the demand side in parentheses. Fk−1 represents the case
where among the other n − 1 consumers on the demand side, there are k − 1 fighters and n − k
quitters.
b The flow payoff to player i and the firm are in the cells. The payoffs to other allies, either
active fighters or early quitters, are not shown in the table.
c The stopping probabilities are (p(n), ..., p(n), q(n)) where n represents the number of the
remaining players on the demand side. Identical consumers are assumed to play the same
strategy if the state of the game does not change.





e In State-n at equilibrium, the continuation values to player i are αai,k where ai is player i’s
action, either fight F or surrender S. k is the number of active fighters excluding player i. There
are 2n − 1 continuation values for player i. At equilibrium, the continuation values to the firm
are always zero therefore not highlighted separately.
The quitting probability p(n) is the solution to the firm’s indifference condition









[1 − p(n)]k[p(n)]n−k + v(n)[p(n)]n = 0
⇔ mnp(n) + v(n)[p(n)]n = mn (4.8)






is a binomial coefficient. k represents the number of active fighters. The
continuation values βs are equal to 0 at equilibrium and therefore omitted. For any
n > 0, m > 0 and v(n) > mn, Equation (4.9) has a positive root in the range of (0, 1), a
negative root and n − 2 imaginary roots if n is an even number. If instead n is odd,
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the equation has a positive root in the range of (0, 1) and n − 1 imaginary roots. The
following results are derived.
Lemma 11. Consumers’ quitting probabilities p(n) increase in the size of the alliance
n. consumers fight less hard when they have potential support from the alliance.
Proof:
Rewriting the indifference condition Equation (4.9), we define the function X(p(n)) =
mp(n) + v[p(n)]n − m. By the implicit function theorem





Lemma 12. In an n-against-one game where the firm fights against a side of n
consumers, when the number of consumers goes to infinity, there is a unique solution to
consumer’s quitting probability limn→+∞ p∗(n) at equilibrium at the limit. The limit of
p∗(n) is 1.
Proof: First we prove that there exists a unique real solution p(n) s.t. X(p(n)) = 0
for any given m, n, v > 0. It is clear that X(p(n)) is continuous on the interval [0, 1].
X(0) → −m < 0 when p(n) → 0 and X(1) → v > 0 when p(n) → 1. By the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there exists at least one p ∈ (0, 1) s.t. X(p) = 0. Suppose there are
two solutions p1 and p2 s.t. p1 = p2 and X(p1) = X(p2) = 0. By Rolle’s theorem, this
implies that X ′(p) = 0. But X ′(p) = m + n[p(n)]n−1v > 0 which is a contradiction.
Now we find the limit. We view p(n) as a sequence with 0 < p(n) < 1 satisfying
Equation (4.9).
mp(n) + v[p(n)]n = m
Divide by p(n) and let y = v/m,




Suppose that the limit of p(n) is not 1. Since p(n) increases in n, the limit, if there
exists any, must be close to 1. Denote the limit as p̃ ± γ where γ is some small
number. We thus have (p̃ ± γ)n−1 → 0 as n → ∞. Plugging this into the LHS gives us
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1 + y[p̃ ± γ]n−1 → 1 while the RHS goes above 1, which is a contradiction. Therefore
the limit of an individual consumer’s quitting probability is
lim
n→+∞ p(n) = 1. (4.10)
Plugging the last equation into Equation (4.9), we immediately get the following
results:
[p(n)]n → 0 (4.11)
[1 − p(n)]n → 0 (4.12)
The limits tell us how consumers’ behave in a boycott. In the very first period, an
individual consumer will almost surely surrender immediately driven by free riding
incentives. However, not all of them will surrender. That is to say, the polluting
firm will only face limited boycotting power from the consumers, but the boycott will
not end soon, given the infinitely large number of consumers. Some will act as ‘loyal
supporters of the product’ who would not boycott the firm, while the rest will act as
‘strict environmentalists’ who boycott for a considerably long period of time. The firm
would thus expect to suffer some financial loss and damage to its corporate image from
the boycott. However, if it is patient enough, such loss will reduce over time due to the
decreasing number of active boycotters.
For the firm, the quitting probability q(n) is the solution to an individual consumer’s
indifference condition
Ui(F ) = Ui(S), i = 1, 2, ..., n



























(indexed by k) are strictly positive and upper bounded at equilibrium.
There are 2n−1 continuation values in State-n overall. When there are k active fighters
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represents the continuation value that player i surrenders and k players remain in the
conflict. In particular, when every player on the demand side surrenders, the game ends
immediately and therefore there is no continuation value, that is,
α
S,0 := 0. (4.16)
The following results are derived.
Lemma 13. In an n-against-one game where the firm fights against a side of n
consumers, when the number of consumers goes to infinity, there is a unique solution
to the firm’s quitting probability limn→+∞ q∗(n) at equilibrium at the limit.6 The limit of
q∗(n) is a function of c, w, ε and less than 1. That is, the firm tends not to surrender. It
always plays mixed strategies.
6The numerical solution for q(n) where n = 1, 2, ..., 5 given different εs is available upon request. It
shows that q(n) fluctuate and increase slowly with n. It implies that the size of the firm has limited
impact on its strategy making.
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Proof: We rewrite the indifference condition (4.13), for q(n) ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1),















































= 1[1 − q(n)]δ
{
c[1 − q(n)] − wq(n) + εq(n)
}
(4.17)




, ∀k are upper bounded and certainly, for
example, less than w which is the maximum utility an individual consumer can possibly





is a function of p(n) and q(n).
Therefore we write it separately. We take the limit on both sides.
lim
n→+∞ LHS = limn→+∞

















































The first term of Equation (4.18) goes to zero at the limit since α
F,n−1 is upper bounded
and, [1 − p(n)]n−1 → 0. Now we show that the second term and, by the same argument,






value Ḡ, or called the mode, is given by k = (n − 1 − 1)p(n) = np(n) if k is an integer;
otherwise, the greatest value is given by largest integer k such that k ≤ np(n).






To find the limit of q(n), now we try to find an upper bound for p(n) which is lower than
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one. We consider this: ∀j such that n > j > 0,
p(n) ≤ p̃ := 1 − j
n
for large n
This must hold.7 8 Then we have
pn(n) ≤ p̃ := (1 −
j
n
)n → e−j > 0
Plugging p̃ into Equation (4.19), we find that for any countable n > 0 and p(n) that





































n − j → 0
7 We find a sequence p̃ such that Equations (4.10) and (4.11) satisfy. Let ∀n and j such that
n > j > 0 ,
p̃ := 1 − j
n
∀k > 0, p̃ = 1 − jn is monotonically increasing in n.
lim












⎤⎦j = (e−1)j = e−j ∈ (0, 1)
As n → +∞,


















8The upper bound p̃ is good enough to find the limit of q(n). We can prove, for example, that for
b < 1, p(n) ≤ p̃1 := 1 − b ln nn is a even lower upper bound. We can also show that for a small finite n,
p(n) ≤ p̃2 := 1 − b1+bn . The proofs are available upon request.
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Analogously, the last term of Equation (4.17) approaches zero at the limit, which makes
the left hand side a summation of three zeros.
The limit of the right hand side of Equation (4.17) is
lim











[1 − q(n)]δ = 0 (4.21)
or lim
n→+∞ c[1 − q(n)] − wq(n) + εq(n) = 0 (4.22)
Equality (4.21) is true if and only if limn→+∞[1 − q(n)]δ → +∞, that is, limn→+∞ q(n) →





c + w − ε < 1
Proposition 6. In an n-against-one game where the firm fights against a side of
n consumers, when the number of consumers goes to infinity, there exists a unique
equilibrium (p∗(n), ..., p∗(n), q∗(n)) in the game where identical players on the demand side
are assumed to play symmetric strategies.
4.5 Conclusion
We develop an uneven game of war of attrition between a weak alliance of two consumers
and one firm. We examine the extension of free riding incentives and alliance advantage
to Maynard Smith (1974)’s classic war of attrition under complete information. While
two sides play a war of attrition, two consumers on one side play a prisoner’s dilemma
against each other. We allow the free rider to receive a prize if the game eventually
ends with his ally’s success. We derive the Nash equilibrium and compare the results to
that of a classic one-against-one war of attrition. For the alliance, we find that selfish
motivation overcomes moral concerns — free riding incentives dominate regardless of
how strong the willingness to beat the firm is. Consumers fight less hard when they
have more potential support from the alliance. The consumer’s probability to surrender
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increases to one much more quickly when compared to the firm’s equilibrium strategy.
We then extend the model to a general case where the size of the demand side
increases. When the market size goes to infinitely large, we find that both sides quit
the game with higher probabilities at equilibrium. Consumers would almost surely
surrender immediately. Meanwhile, the firm’s equilibrium strategies do not change
significantly regardless of the number of the competitors. Therefore the game slowly
becomes a one-sided war of attrition where the firm cannot be defeated easily by the
consumers.
We employ the model to explain consumer boycott where consumers on the demand
side fight against a misbehaving monopolist on the supply side. Our results suggest
that in a market where a big firm serves many consumers, the real boycotting power is
limited by consumers’ free riding incentives. Over time the polluting firm suffers less
costs due to the decreasing number of active boycotters. That is to say, for a strong
enough firm that can survive the first several tough periods, the game will slowly favour
the amoral firm and make it difficult for the consumers to win. Another possible real-life
application of this model can be a labour strike where mass employees fight against
an employer that offers unfair wages. The results therefore suggest the importance of
third party intervention, either by the government or a non-profit organization. To




The detailed solution to the firm’s quitting probabilities at equilibrium at State-2 in
Equation (4.7) is
q∗(2) = (4α2δ
2m2 + δ(−α1 + α2(−1 + 8δ) − ε)mv − 4α2δ2m
√
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√
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√
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Chapter 5
A Note on Firms’ Ethics, Consumer
Boycotts, and Signalling1
5.1 Introduction
Glazer et al. (2010) develop a duopoly model of consumer boycott. The model discusses
how a boycott affects firms’ strategies in choosing production technology and output.
We first present the model briefly and then discuss the determination of equilibrium
strategies in Section 5.1. We derive the subgame perfect equilibria of the whole game
in Section 5.2. In the rest of the article, we propose a solution to the model by
considering Bertrand competition as an extension to the original article. In Section 5.3,
we discuss the settings and key assumptions. In Sections 5.4 and 5.5, we derive the
firms’ equilibrium strategies by backward induction. Section 5.6 concludes the article.
In a market, two firms compete for market share by selling physically identical
products. The products are however differentiable by the production process, either
clean or polluting. With an additional fixed production cost c, a firm can choose the
expensive clean technology. Producing with the polluting technology does not require
any additional cost. Consumers view the clean firm as ethical (H) and the polluting
firm as non-ethical (L).
There are two types of consumers: a-type is high moral and b-type is low moral.
The numbers of a-type and b-type are scaled to n and 1, respectively. Consumers are
utility maximising taking account of the cost of social pressure b. The cost arises only
1This chapter is an extension to a published article written by Glazer et al. (2010).
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from non-boycotting behaviour, that is, buying from the polluting firm and ignoring the
firm’s ethical code. Buying from the clean firm does not involve such cost. Consumers
of a-type choose between buying at Firm H or not buying anything. Based on their
willingness to pay for the products, a-type consumers are indexed in decreasing order
on i ∈ [0, n]. The utility function of a-type is given by
Ui =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
β(1 − i/n) − PH , if she/he chooses Firm H
0, otherwise
(5.1)
where PH is the asking price set by Firm H and β is some scale to the utility gain from
purchasing. A larger β indicates higher valuation for the product. Consumers of b-type
can choose from buying at either firm or buying nothing. Based on their willingness to
pay for the products, b-type consumers are indexed in decreasing order on j ∈ [0, 1].
The utility function of b-type is given by
Uj =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
β(1 − j) − PH , if she/he chooses Firm H
β(1 − j) − PL − b, if she/he chooses Firm L
0, otherwise
(5.2)
where PL is the product price set by Firm L and b is the cost of social pressure if a
consumer buys from the polluting firm.





10 Xm Xm + Xl
H L N
Note: The willingness to pay of a-type consumers is in [0, n] in decreasing order. The willingness to
pay of b-type consumers is in [0, 1] in decreasing order. The choice variables aj ∈ {H, L, N} represent
the actions of purchasing from Firm H, purchasing from Firm L, and not buying anything.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the consumers’ willingness to pay and the preferred actions for
both types. For a-type consumers, as 0 (at the left end of the first line) represents the
highest willingness to pay and their willingness decreases when moving towards n at
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the right end, there must exist some marginal consumer Xh in the middle of the line
who is indifferent between Firm H and not buying. Similarly, for b-type consumers,
since they have three choices, there must exist two marginal consumers such that in
the range of [0, Xm), they strictly prefer Firm H; in the range of (Xm, Xm + Xl), they
strictly prefer Firm L; otherwise they buy nothing.
The critical marginal consumers are defined by the authors of the original article as
follows. Note that we have changed the notation J to avoid confusion.
Xm: “The benefit from signalling is sufficient so that some, i.e., Xm, do. The
marginal low-moral consumer must be indifferent between the two markets.”
J = Xm + Xl: “The marginal low-moral consumer (with an index J =
Xm + Xl) is indifferent between buying at Firm L or buying nothing.”
The authors thus solve the indifference condition for the marginal consumers and find
that
“all the low-moral types are indifferent between the two markets.”
The equilibrium is derived under the condition that the price difference PH − PL is
equal to the cost of social pressure b (Lemma 1 of Glazer et al. (2010)). The optimal
outputs at equilibrium are given by
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
YH = Xh + Xm
YL = Xl
where Xm = 1−n3 +
(1+2n)b
3β as solved in Corollary 1. Xm is unique since n, β and b are
exogenously given.
5.1.1 Marginal Consumer and Equilibrium Determination
Now we go back to the definition of Xm and Lemma 1 of Glazer et al. (2010). We
find that the consumer indexed by Xm is not uniquely determined. Since all b-type
consumers are indifferent between two firms, they all fit the criteria of being the marginal.
If the benefit from buying at Firm H is sufficient for some amount of consumers Xm,2
2Xm has two meanings. As stated in Section Assumptions on Page 341, consumers are indexed in
decreasing order on [0,1] therefore the m − th consumer with willingness to pay Xm is the marginal.
Xm also represents the total number of b-type purchasing consumers at Firm H.
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such benefit should be also sufficient for every b-type consumer. These make each
b-type a potential marginal consumer.
Instead of having one marginal consumer Xm, we have many and they are indexed
in the range of [0, Xm + Xl]. The rest indexed in (Xm + Xl, 1] maximize their utilities
by not buying anything.
max
aj∈{H,L,N}
{Uj(H), Uj(L), Uj(N)} = 0 =: Uj(N)
where Uj(H) = Uj(L). The marginal consumer J = Xm + Xl is indifferent from buying
at either firm and buying nothing, where the value of J depends on Xm.
Determining the marginal consumers Xm and J is critical since it affects the
determination of firms’ equilibrium outputs. Both Xm and J have double meanings.
They also tell us how many consumers would buy from each firm. For a pair of marginal
consumers (Xm, J), we would find a unique solution to the equilibrium outputs. This
means that we shall have a continuous set of equilibria given that the marginal consumers
are not uniquely determined.
At equilibrium, the output of H firm, YH , can vary from Xh, if it only serves a-type,
to Xh + Xm + Xl, if it serves both types. Meanwhile L firm’s output YL is Xm + Xl at
maximum and 0 at minimum, depending on the assumption imposed on the preferred
moves of the indifferent consumers. In the worst case scenario, L firm can be ‘forced’
to leave the market since it cannot make trades with any consumers.
We construct equilibria in two polar cases, just to demonstrate our point. First,
since all b-type consumers in [0, Xm + Xl] are indifferent between two firms, let us
assume they all pick H Firm. Firms’ outputs are thus
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩




Plug it into the condition in Lemma 1 of Glazer et al. (2010),
PH − PL = b
β(1 − Xh/n) − [β(1 − Xm − Xl) − b] = b
⇒ Xm + Xl = YH
n + 1 = Xh/n.
Firm H maximizes its profit by choosing the quantity YH .
max
YH
πH = YHPH − c
= YHβ(1 − Xh/n) − c
= YHβ(1 − YH
n + 1) − c,
where c is the fixed cost of production. The first order condition with respect to YH
gives
β − 2β
n + 1YH = 0
⇒ YH = n + 12 . (5.4)
Therefore the equilibrium outputs are given by Equations (5.3) and (5.4). Recall
that the numbers of a-type and b-type consumers are n and 1, respectively. The last
equation tells us that the ethical Firm H would serve half of the population in the
market. Meanwhile the non-ethical Firm L would find it difficult to sell anything.
Second, we assume that all the indifferent consumers in [0, Xm + Xl] choose Firm L.
Firms’ outputs are thus
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
YH = Xh
YL = Xm + Xl.
(5.5)
Plugging these to the condition PH − PL = b, we get
β(1 − Xh/n) − [β(1 − Xm − Xl) − b] = b
⇒ Xm + Xl = Xh/n = YH/n.
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Firm H maximizes its profit by choosing the quantity YH .
max
YH
πH = YHPH − c
= YHβ(1 − Xh/n) − c
= YHβ(1 − YH/n) − c.




⇒ YH = n2 (5.6)
⇒ YL = Xm + Xl = YH/n = 12 . (5.7)
Therefore the equilibrium outputs are given by Equations (5.6) and (5.7).
To summarize, there should exist infinitely many equilibria and the equilibrium
determined by the authors of the original article is one of them. However, the equilibrium
can be unique by, as shown above, assuming that all the indifferent consumers choose
Firm L (or H), that is, they all prefer to (or prefer not to) endure the social pressure and
pay the additional cost b. Alternatively, we can assume that the indifferent consumers
split into two groups according to some criteria. For example, half of them buy from
Firm L and the other half buy from Firm H.
5.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We have discussed the equilibrium uniqueness and constructed equilibria in two polar
cases following the method used in the original article. In this section, we solve the
subgame perfect equilibria.
5.2.1 Optimal Outputs
The game is solved backwards. In the second stage, two firms decide the outputs.
We introduce a new variable: denote the number of b-type low-moral consumers who
purchase from Firm H by x ∈ [0, J ]. When x = 0, the b-type consumers who are
indifferent between two firms choose Firm L. When x = J , the indifferent consumers
103
choose Firm H. Thus two firms’ outputs are
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
YH = Xh + x
YL = Xm + Xl − x = J − x.
(5.8)




πH = YHPH − c
= YHβ(1 − Xh/n) − c
= YHβ(1 − YH/n + x/n) − c.








= YLβ(1 − J)
= YLβ(1 − YL − x).
The first order condition with respect to YL gives
β − 2βYL − βx = 0
⇒ YL = 1 − x2 . (5.10)
Plugging the optimal outputs into the profit functions, we get the equilibrium profits





πL = 14b(x − 1)2.
(5.11)
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A firm has an incentives to adopt the clean technology only if the fixed cost c is
sufficiently low, that is
πH ≥ 0
⇒ c ≤ bn
2 + 2bnx + bx2
4n (5.12)
Since the value of x varies depends on the assumption imposed on the preference of
indifferent consumers, as discussed above, there are infinitely many equilibria. However,
for each x, the equilibrium is unique.
The determination of the marginals does not affect the solutions to the optimal
outputs when two firms choose the same technology. Therefore we do not repeat the
calculation here. As shown in the original article, when both firms choose the polluting
technology L, they are indexed by A and B. The optimal outputs are
Y LLf =
β − b
3β , f ∈ {A, B}




When both firms choose the clean technology H, the optimal outputs are
Y HHf =
1 + n
3 , f ∈ {A, B}
and the profits are
πHHf =
(1 + n)β
9 − cf .
5.2.2 Selection in Production Technology
Now we solve the strategies in technology selection in the first stage and therefore derive
the subgame perfect equilibria of the game. In the first stage, two firms simultaneously
choose the production technology, either clean (H) or polluting (L). The game is
illustrated in Table (5.1). where cf is the cost of investing in the clean technology for
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4b(x − 1)2 qA






9β 1 − qA
qB 1 − qB
a Firm f, f ∈ {A, B} chooses from the clean technology H or the polluting technology L.
The adoption of the clean technology needs the fixed production cost cf .
b The probability qf , f ∈ {A, B} is the probability that firm f chooses the clean technology
H.
each firm, f ∈ {A, B}, qf ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that firm f chooses to invest and x
is the number of b-type indifferent consumers who choose firm H.
Depending on the assumption on consumers’ preferences, the value of x can be
uniquely pinned down. Since the number of a-type high-moral consumers n, the cost of
social pressure b, the fixed production cost of clean technology cf and the value of β
are exogenously given, we can determine the equilibrium. Here we give an example.
Proposition 7. There exists two pure strategy equilibria such that both firms choose
the same technology, that is, (H, H) and (L, L) if the conditions
(1 + n)β








hold, where f ∈ {A, B}. There exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where firm f chooses
the clean technology with the probability qf that is given by
qf =
4b2n + 4β(β + 9c−f )n − bβ[n(8 + 9n) + 18nx + 9x2]
4b2n + 4β2n(2 + n) − bβ[n(17 + 9n) + 9(1 + n)x2] .
In the rest of the article, we propose a solution to the model by considering Bertrand
competition as an extension to Glazer et al. (2010). In the settings of the model, three
major changes to the original article are highlighted. The game is solved backwards.
We first determine the firm’s optimal pricing strategies in the second stage. Then we
derive the firms’ strategies in technology selection in the first stage.
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5.3 Bertrand Competition
We employ a consumer boycott model and examine the role of boycotts in market
competition. We discuss how consumers’ moral values and boycotting behaviours affect
firms’ decision-making in pricing and production technology selection. We find out
under what conditions firms are able to achieve positive profits. We study whether
investing in the clean technology (behaving ethically) generates higher returns than
using the polluting technology (behaving unethically). We keep the assumptions and
settings of the original article unless stated otherwise.
In the duopoly market, two firms sell one type of product. The production technology
can differ, either clean or polluting. There are two types of consumers in the market.
Consumers of a-type are environmentalists and never buy from the polluting firm. The
action set of a-type is binary aj ∈ {H, N} which represents the purchasing behaviour
at Firm H or buying nothing, respectively. The mass of a-type consumers is n and they
are indexed on i ∈ [0, n]. Consumers of b-type do not have environmental concerns
so they choose the firm which brings them higher utility. The action set of b-type is
aj ∈ {H, L, N} where L represents the purchasing behaviour from Firm L. The mass
of b-type is 1 and they are indexed on j ∈ [0, 1]. In Glazer et al. (2010) model, β, as
shown in Equations (5.1) and (5.2), is an exogenously given parameter in consumers’
utility functions, i.e., its value is same to everyone. For simplicity, we set β = 1.3 Thus





− PH , if she/he chooses Firm H
0, otherwise
(5.13)
The utility function of b-type consumer j becomes:
Uj =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 − j − PH , if she/he chooses Firm H
1 − j − PL − b, if she/he chooses Firm L
0, otherwise
(5.14)
where the cost of social pressure b > 0 is common knowledge and sufficiently large so
3It can be shown that the selection of β does not change the main results.
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that all a-type and some b-type consumers have strong incentive to boycott.4 Since
a-type consumers always boycott and b-type are potential boycotters, the size of a-type
is very important to firms’ technology selection. We assume the size n to be large
enough so that a-type consumers have some power to potentially “force” firm(s) to
perform environmentally-friendly actions. If this assumption is not satisfied, firm(s)
can simply ignore the consumers’ boycott since the potential financial loss arising from
the boycott is very limited. We also assume that the cost of investing in the clean
technology c is small enough so that firm(s) can afford it and is(are) willing to pay
for it. Otherwise firm(s) would prefer the polluting technology with zero extra cost.
We further assume that the product is a normal good but not a necessity. Otherwise
consumers have less incentive to boycott. This explains why a-type consumers are able
to not buy anything.
The game is played in two stages under complete information. In the first stage,
firms simultaneously decide which production technology to adopt. In the second stage,
firms choose the price. The game is solved backwards. Starting from the second stage,
we consider the production technology that has been chosen in the first stage: (1) when
one firm has invested in the clean technology; (2) when both firms have invested in
the clean technology; and (3) when both firms have chosen the polluting technology.
Then we move to the first stage and solve the strategies in technology selection. The
subgame perfect equilibria are thus derived.
Three main changes are made as follows. First, we reform the model by permitting
the relaxation of Lemma 1 (PH − PL = b). Firm H chooses the best response to Firm
L’s pricing strategy, which leads us to three possibilities: the price PH is equal to,
larger than, or smaller than the summation of the exogenously given cost b and the
endogenously chosen PL. Second, we make an assumption on indifferent consumers.
Assumption 2 (Sufficient social cost). For a large enough cost of social pressure b, the
consumer who is indifferent between two firms buys from Firm H.
Low-moral consumers favour Firm L if only if it brings strictly higher utility.
However, for a small b, we impose a different assumption and provide the intuition
later. Third, firms decide price. We contribute to the original work by deriving the
equilibrium strategies in Bertrand competition settings.
4Later in this article, we discuss the special case when b is very small (see Assumption 3).
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5.4 Pricing Strategies
The game is solved by backward induction. We first derive firms’ optimal pricing
strategies in the second stage conditional on firms’ technology selection in the first stage.
In each of the following cases, we derive the pricing strategies and discuss the role of
the cost of social pressure b.
5.4.1 Case 1: Only One Firm Invests in the Clean Technology
We start from the case where only one of the two firms has invested in the clean
technology in the first stage. Under the conditions that PH is equal to, smaller than
or larger than PL + b, we check whether equilibria can exist in the the second stage.
If there exists any, we derive the optimal pricing strategies. We show that there is no
equilibrium under the condition of the cost of social pressure b ≥ PH − PL; equilibria
exist under the condition b < PH − PL.
5.4.1.1 PH = PL + b
Consider Firm H sets a considerably high price such that, to each consumer, the cost
of purchasing from it (PH) equals the total cost of purchasing at its rival (PL + b).
Consumers have different preferences and this is known to both firms. Consumers of
a-type do not buy from Firm L. Thus Firm L’s targeted consumer group is b-type. To
each consumer j of b-type, buying from Firm H brings her/him the same utility as
from Firm L.
Uj(H) := 1 − j − PH
= 1 − j − PL − b =: Uj(L)
By assumption, when b is sufficiently large, the consumer who is indifferent between
two firms chooses Firm H. Hence no one in the market chooses Firm L. Firm H is able
to choose any price level PH as long as PH = PL + b holds. The total mass of potential
customers for Firm H is 1 + n, i.e., Firm H may serve the entire market. The marginal
a-type consumer indexed by Xh is indifferent between buying from Firm H and buying
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nothing:
Ui(H) := 1 − Xh
n + 1 − PH
= 0 =: Ui(N)
⇒ Xh = (1 + n)(1 − PH)
Firm H chooses the optimal price P ∗H to maximise its own profit πHLH :
max
PH
πHLH = XhPH − c
∂πHLH
∂PH
= (n + 1)PH(−1) + (n + 1)(1 − PH) = 0
⇒ P ∗H =
1
2 (5.15)
Meanwhile, Firm L sets PL = PH − b = 12 − b and sells nothing. It is clearly not an
equilibrium since Firm L can easily find profitable deviation by lowering the price PL
slightly to attract some b-type consumers.
5.4.1.2 PH < PL + b
Now consider that Firm H sets the price PH to a low level that is less than the total
cost of purchasing from its rival (PL + b). Similar to the above case, Firm H attracts
both a-type and b-type consumers. To each b-type consumer j, buying from Firm H
brings her/him strictly higher utility than buying from Firm L.
Uj(H) := 1 − j − PH
> 1 − j − PL − b =: Uj(L)
No one in the market buys from Firm L since it is so costly to do so. Again Firm H is
able to choose any price PH as long as PH < PL + b holds. The total mass of potential
customers for Firm H is 1 + n. It is optimal to set P ∗H = 12 . This is not an equilibrium
since Firm L can do better by lowering the price PL to attract b-type consumers.
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5.4.1.3 PH > PL + b
For an equilibrium to be possible, the total cost from choosing Firm L (PL + b) needs
to be smaller than from choosing Firm H. That is, to b-type consumer j, buying from
Firm L brings her/him strictly higher utility.
Uj(H) := 1 − j − PH
< 1 − j − PL − b =: Uj(L)
We check two conditions: (a) b ≥ 12 ; and (b) b ∈ (0, 12). Under Condition (a), the
cost of social pressure is high enough so that it is very hard for Firm L to get consumers.
At the same time, Firm H enjoys the benefit of social pressure. The mass of potential
consumers for Firm H is n. The marginal moral consumer Xh of a-type satisfies:
Ui(H) := 1 − Xh
n
− PH
= 0 := Ui(N)
⇒ Xh = n(1 − PH)
Firm H chooses the optimal price P ∗H to maximize its own profit πHLH :
max
PH
πHLH = XhPH − c
∂πHLH
∂PH
= (n + 1)PH(−1) + (n + 1)(1 − PH) = 0
⇒ P ∗H =
1
2
Thus we find an equilibrium where the prices are PH = 12 and PL = 0. Plugging the
prices into the profit functions, we find that Firm H’s profit is πHLH (PH) = n+14 − c and
Firm L’s payoff is πHLL (PL) = 0. Both have no incentive to deviate. Investing in the
clean technology is profitable for large enough n and small enough c.
Proposition 8. When two firms have chosen different technologies in the first stage of
the game, for b ∈ [12 , +∞), there is a unique equilibrium where Firm H with the clean
technology sets the price PH = 12 and Firm L with the polluting technology sets the price
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to Firm H and
πHLL = 0
to Firm L. [EQU1]
Under Condition (b) b ∈ (0, 12), we consider the following candidate equilibria: (i)
For a larger b, Firm H sets a relatively lower price (PH = b) to attract both types;
meanwhile Firm L chooses PL = 0; and (ii) for a smaller b, Firm H increases the price
(PH = 12) such that it gets a-type consumers and Firm L gets b-type; Firm L chooses
PL = 12 − b > 0.
We first derive the condition for (i) to be favoured over (ii). When PH = b, since no
one buys from Firm L, the mass of potential consumers for Firm H is n + 1. When
PH = 12 , the mass of potential consumers for Firm H decreases to n. We further assume
that if Firm H is indifferent from choosing PH = b < 1/2 and PH = 12 , it prefers the
former so that it can serve a bigger share of the market. Thus Firm H chooses (i) if it
brings higher profit.
πHLH (PH = b) ≥ πHLH (PH =
1
2)
[(1 + n)(1 − b)]b − c ≥ [n(1 − 12)]
1
2 − c
(1 + n)(1 − b)b ≥ n4
⇒ b2(4 + 4n) + b(−4 − 4n) + n ≤ 0








Firm H has no incentive to deviate from PH = b since it is derived by profit maximising.
Also Firm L has no incentive to deviate from PL = 0 since there is no way to generate
non-zero profit when the conditions (5.16) and PH = b hold. So this is an equilibrium.
Proposition 9. When two firms have chosen different technologies in the first stage of
the game, for b ∈ [12 − 12√n+1 , 12), there is a unique equilibrium where Firm H with the
clean technology sets the price PH = b and Firm L with the polluting technology sets
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the price PL = 0 such that the profits are πHLH = (1 + n)(1 − b)b − c to Firm H and
πHLL = 0 to Firm L. [EQU2]
Now we consider the candidate equilibrium (ii) PH = 12 and PL =
1
2 − b. By
0 < PL < PH − b, Firm L is able to attract b-type consumers and meanwhile Firm H
only attracts a-type. Now each firm sets the price targeting only one type of consumer.
Unlike the standard Bertrand duopoly model, it seems possible for both firms to obtain
non-zero revenue.
When b ∈ (0, 12 − 12√n+1), Firm H obtains the maximum profit by setting PH = 12 .
Firm L attracts some consumers as long as PL < PH − b holds. Clearly at PH = 12 , Firm
L’s profit πHLL (PL) is monotonically increasing in price PL on the support [0, 12 − b).
Thus for a small positive number ε, Firm L obtains non-zero profit by setting PL =
PH − b − ε = 12 − b − ε. In this special case, for an equilibrium to be possible, we make
an assumption:
Assumption 3 (Insufficient social cost). For a small enough b ∈ (0, 12 − 12√n+1), the
consumer who is indifferent between two firms chooses Firm L.
The interpretation is given as follows: When the cost of social pressure is not
sufficiently large, society only considers firms’ non-ethical behaviour (polluting) and
consumers’ amoral behaviour (not boycotting) as small issues. The society does not
harshly censure non-ethical attitudes or behaviour. For low-moral (b-type) consumers,
the benefit from boycotting (to avoid the social cost) is no longer significant for utility
improvement. That is to say, for the indifferent consumers (who are indifferent between
two firms), the incentives to engage in boycotting activity decrease with the cost of
social pressure b. Thus we suggest that there is a cutoff point b̂ = 12 − 12√n+1 such that
for any b ≥ b̂, the indifferent consumer prefers to boycott the polluting firm(s); for any
b < b̂, the indifferent consumer prefers to pay a lower product price (PL) and not to
boycott.
Under this assumption, we are now able to derive the pricing strategies for both
firms. For a small enough b, there is an equilibrium where both firms obtain non-zero
revenue by setting PH = 12 and PL =
1
2 − b respectively. Plugging the prices into the
profit functions, we find that Firm H’s profit is πHLH = n4 − c and Firm L’s profit is
πHLL = 14 − 12b.
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Proposition 10. When two firms have chosen different technologies in the first stage
of the game, for b ∈ (0, 12 − 12√n+1), there is a unique equilibrium where Firm H with
the clean technology sets the price PH = 12 and Firm L with the polluting technology sets
the price PL = 12 − b such that the profits πHLH = n4 − c to Firm H and πHLL = 14 − 12b to
Firm L. [EQU3]
From the above results, we note that for a large enough n and a small enough c
as assumed, Firm H is able to make non-zero profit at equilibria. The conditions are
c < n+14 in [EQU1]; and c < (1 + n)(1 − b)b in [EQU2]. Both firms are able to make
non-zero profit at equilibrium if b is small enough: c < n4 and b <
1
2 − 12√n+1 in [EQU3].
This means that between two firms with different ethical codes, it is certainly beneficial
to be social responsible and show concern for the environment (as Firm H does), but
we cannot conclude that there is no benefit to be the non-ethical one (as Firm L is). In
a society where the average level of social responsibility concern is sufficiently low, an
unethical firm can make positive profits in price competition, and in some circumstances,
even make higher profits than the high-ethics firm.
5.4.2 Case 2: Both Firms Invest in the Clean Technology
Now we consider the case where both firms have invested in the clean technology in the
first stage. Let them be Firm A and Firm B. Each Firm needs to pay a fixed cost to
adopt the clean technology cf , f ∈ {A, B} and there is no marginal cost. When two
firms choose the same technology, either clean or polluting, it is similar to the standard
Bertrand duopoly model: each firm sells perfectly identical products; two firms equally
share the market by setting the same price; both firms make zero revenue.
When both firms use the clean technology, the total mass of the potential consumer
is 1 + n. Let XHH be the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying and not
buying, and PH be the product price.
1 − XHH1 + n − PH = 0
⇒ XHH = (1 + n)(1 − PH)
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Let XA and XB be the number of consumers who choose Firm A and Firm B respectively.




2(1 + n)(1 − PH)
Firm f makes profit πHHf , f ∈ {A, B}
πHHf = XfPH − cf
Since the firm with the lower price attracts all the consumers, there is a unique
equilibrium when both firms choose PH = 0. Since they need to pay the cost of
investing in the clean technology cf > 0, f ∈ {A, B}, they actually make negative
profits. The firm with the higher investing cost suffers a bigger loss. Two firms together
serve the entire market, i.e., the mass of purchasing consumers is 1 + n.
So, when there is no outside option such that firms can exit the market and obtain
zero profit, for example, due to legal restrictions or the cost of exit, both firms choose
the clean technology with zero product price.
Proposition 11. When both firms have chosen the clean technology in the first stage
of the game, ∀b, there is a unique equilibrium where both firms choose PH = 0 such that
the profits are πHHA = −cA and πHHB = −cB. [EQU4]
5.4.3 Case 3: No Firm Invests in the Clean Technology
Now we consider the case where no firm has invested in the clean technology in the first
stage. The mass of potential consumers now reduces to 1 since a-type consumers do
not buy from the polluting firms. Let XLL be the marginal consumer who is indifferent
between buying and not buying.
1 − XLL − b − PL = 0
⇒ XA = XB = 12XLL =
1 − b − PL
2
where two firms equally share the market by setting the same price PL.
Analogously to the case above, there is an equilibrium when PL = 0 such that both
firms obtain zero revenue. We notice that the mass of purchasing consumers is 1 − b
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and all of them are of b-type. That is, in such case two firms jointly serve the smallest
share of the market.
Proposition 12. When both firms have chosen the polluting technology in the first
stage of the game, ∀b, there is a unique equilibrium where both firms choose PL = 0
such that the profits are πHHA = πHHB = 0. [EQU5]
5.5 Selection in Production Technology
We have derived the pricing strategies in the second stage conditional on firms’ technology
adopted in the previous stage. Now we solve the strategies in technology selection and
therefore derive the subgame perfect equilibria of the game. In the first stage, two
firms simultaneously choose which technology to use. We consider three cases: (a)
b ∈ [12 , +∞); (b) b ∈ [12 − 12√n+1 , 12); and (c) b ∈ (0, 12 − 12√n+1). The game is illustrated
in Table (5.2).




H −cA, −cB πHLH (cA), πHLL (cB) qA
L πHLL (cA), πHLH (cB) 0, 0 1 − qA
qB 1 − qB
a Firm f, f ∈ {A, B} chooses from the clean technology H or the polluting
technology L.






4 − cf and π
HL
L = 0, if b ∈ [
1
2 , +∞)



























are generated by Equilibria [EQU1] - [EQU3]. cf is the cost of investing in the clean
technology for each firm, f ∈ {A, B}. qf ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that firm f chooses
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to invest.
We immediately see that there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria (H,L) and
(L,H) which represent the cases where only one firm invests in the clean technology.
These two equilibria therefore give us the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. For Firm
f ∈ {A, B}, the utility of choosing the clean technology H should be equal to that of
choosing the polluting technology.
Uf (H) := (−c−f )q−f + πHLH (cf )(1 − q−f )
= πHLL (cf )q−f + 0 =: Uf (H)
⇒ qf = π
HL
H (c−f )
(c−f ) + πHLH (c−f ) + πHLL (c−f )
(5.18)
Therefore we derive the subgame perfect equilibria in the game of boycott.
Proposition 13. ∀b, there is a equilibrium in the boycott game such that two firms
choose different production technology in the first stage and choose the pricing strategies
in the second stage as shown in [EQU1] - [EQU3]. The payoffs are given by (5.17);
[SPE1]
∀b, there is a equilibrium in the boycott game such that firm f ∈ {A, B} chooses the
clean technology with probability qf that is given by Equation (5.18) in the first stage
and chooses the pricing strategy in the second stage as shown in [EQU4] - [EQU5].
[SPE2]
The results suggest that it is profitable for a firm to differentiate itself by investing in
expensive clean technology, supported by non-zero profits in the pure strategy equilibria.
If two firms use symmetric mixed strategies, the clean technology would be adopted
with some probability that is jointly determined by the cost of investing (c), the number
of a-type consumers with high moral concern (n) and the cost of social pressure (b).
5.6 Conclusion
We discuss the Glazer et al. (2010) and suggest the existence of other equilibria in the
output determining stage. We demonstrate our argument by constructing the equilibria
in two polar cases. We then derive the subgame perfect equilibria for the whole game.
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As an extension to the original article, we consider the Bertrand competition. The
game is solved by backward induction. In the second stage, we derive the optimal
pricing strategies considering firms’ technology selection made in the previous stage: (1)
only one firm invests in clean technology; (2) both firms invest; and (3) no firm invests.
We find that, in the first case, the ethical firm using the expensive environment-friendly
technology (Firm H) is able to make non-zero profit at equilibria due to the consumers’
different preferences and the benefit arising from the cost of social pressure. The
non-ethical firm using the cheap polluting technology (Firm L) is able to make non-zero
profit at equilibrium only if b is sufficiently small. In the second and third cases, it
becomes a standard price competition model where both firms make zero revenue by
setting the same price at zero.
The pricing strategies that generates positive profits are highlighted as follows:
(a) When b ∈ [12 , +∞), the ethical firm with the clean technology is able to make
non-zero profit if the cost of investing in the clean technology c is small enough and n
is large enough such that πHLH (PH = 12) =
n
4 − c > 0;
(b) When b ∈ [ 12 − 12√n+1 , 12), the ethical firm is able to make non-zero profit if c is
small enough and n is large enough such that πHLH (PH = b) = (1 + n)(1 − b)b − c > 0 ;
(c) When b ∈ (0, 12 − 12√n+1), by assuming that the consumer who is indifferent
between two firms chooses L firm, both firms are able to make non-zero profit for
suitable c and n such that πHLH (PH = 12) =
n
4 − c > 0 and πHLL (PL = 12 − b) = 14 − 12b > 0.
The results suggest that firms’ strategies largely depend on the value of social cost
b. In a market where not many consumers care about environmental protection, firms
prefer to use the polluting technology. This implies that improving society’s awareness
of social responsibility increases social pressure on non-ethical attitudes and behaviour.
Thus consumers’ incentives to boycott grow stronger. A higher boycotting power leads
to a higher probability to force the firms to act ethically.
We then solve the strategies in production technology selection in the first stage.
Therefore we derive the subgame perfect equilibria of the boycott game. We conclude
that investing in the clean technology (behaving ethically) is not necessarily the optimal
strategy for firms, in terms of payoff maximizing, although the ethical firms do benefit
from the consumers’ moral concerns and the cost of social pressure.
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